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2. 
FOREWORD 
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to 
control damage from debris in the Shuttle operational 
environment and to make the control measures a part of routine 
launch flows. These measures include engineering surveillance 
during vehicle processing and closeout operations, facility 
and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and 
photographic analysis of mission events. 
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch, 
on-orbit, and landing provide significant data in verifying 
proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In 
addition to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Photo/Video 
Analysis, reports from Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space 
Flight Center, and Rockwell International - Downey are also 
included in this document to provide an integrated assessment 
of the mission.
1].
Shuttle Mission STS-56 was launched at 1:29 a.m. local 4/8/93 
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The pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle 
was conducted on 4 April 1993. The detailed walkdown of Launch 
Pad 39B and MLP-1 also included the primary flight elements 
OV-103 Discovery (16th flight), ET-54 (LWT 47), and BI-058 
SRB's. There were no vehicle anomalies. 
An Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was performed 
on 5 April 1993. There were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or 
NSTS-08303 violations. There were no conditions outside of the 
established data base. In spite of the warm ambient weather 
conditions, an ice/frost line formed along the edge of the LH2 
tank PAL ramp and three of the cable tray ice/frost ramp aft 
edges. A 12 inch long by 1/4-inch wide crack was visible in the 
-Y vertical strut cable tray forward surface TPS near the 
longeron closeout interface. The crack, which exhibited no 
offset and was not filled with ice or frost, was acceptable for 
launch per the NSTS-08303 criteria. IPR 56V-0105 taken against 
dark markings on the LH SRB case near the center field joint 
closeout appeared to be deposits of field joint closeout 
grease. 
The launch of STS-56 was aborted due to a problem with the MPS 
LH2 high point bleed valve instrumentation. No significant 
vehicle damage was observed during the external post drain 
inspection. No IPR's were taken as a result of the inspection 
and all TPS anomalies were acceptable for the next launch 
attempt per the NSTS-08303 criteria. 
An Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was performed 
for the second launch attempt on 7 April 1993 during the two 
hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There were no 
Launch Commit Criteria, OS, or NSTS-08303 violations. One IPR 
was taken due to a GH2 vent line hydrogen leak. The External 
Tank exhibited light condensate on the TPS acreage. The LH2 
ET/ORB umbilical leak sensor detected no significant hydrogen 
leakage during the cryoload. No unusual vapors or cryogenic 
drips were visible during tanking, stable replenish, and 
launch. 
A 12-inch long crack in the -Y vertical strut cable tray 
forward surface TPS near the longeron closeout interface 
(previously observed during the first cryoload) had increased 
in length. A 4-inch crack, propagating outboard from the ET 
interface, is most likely a continuation of the 12-inch crack 
along the inboard side of the vertical strut/cable tray. The 
4-inch crack exhibited some offset, which was caused by 
structural deflection rather than a TPS debond. The appearance 
of the crack was expected due to the elimination of the stress 
relief gap at the factory and was acceptable for flight per the 
NSTS-08303 criteria.
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Venting vapors and an ice/frost buildup at the GH2 vent line 90 
degree elbow/flex line flange (covered by an ice shroud) indi-
cated the presence of a hydrogen leak, which was confirmed by a 
hydrogen detection meter. Since the leaking hydrogen was not 
driven by a pressurized GH2 vent line, and the line itself 
would be purged at T-90 seconds, the condition was not a 
constraint to launch. The ice buildup measured 10" x 4" x 3/8" 
thick and may have been a debris threat to Orbiter tiles. 
However, the easterly winds and the structurally enclosed area 
of the ice buildup would prevent large pieces of ice from 
falling toward the vehicle. Post launch disassembly of the 
elbow/flex line flange revealed the old Fluorogreen gasket, 
which was cracked, had not been removed prior to installation 
of the new Fluorogold gasket. In addition, the flange bolts had 
not been re-torqued after the last cryogenic loading cycle. 
A debris inspection of Pad 39B was performed after launch. A 
plunger, spring, and associated hardware from the Debris 
Containment System (DCS) was found on hoiddown post #5 still 
attached to the stud. This hardware is normally contained in 
the DCS housing and remains with the SRB aft skirt during 
flight. No TPS materials or other flight hardware were found. 
No frangible nut/ordnance fragments were found. Damage to the 
facility overall was minimal. 
A total of 129 film and video items were analyzed as part of 
the post launch data review. No major vehicle damage or lost 
flight hardware was observed that would have affected the 
mission. No film data of the HDP #5 DCS plunger anomaly was 
obtained due to film breakage in the closest camera. No other 
MLP or FSS films viewed the HDP #5 area. However, several films 
viewing the Orbiter lower surface showed no unidentified debris 
objects moving toward the Orbiter from the LH SRB aft skirt 
area and no obvious tile damage from debris impacts. No stud 
hang-ups occurred and no ordnance debris fell from any of the 
HDP DCS/stud holes. All T-0 umbilicals operated properly. 
On-orbit imagery from the flight crew handheld photography 
revealed as many as 12 divots in the LH2 tank-to-iritertank 
flange closeout on the ET -z side. Some of the divots were 
10-12 inches in diameter. As many as 11 divots were also 
present in the intertarik acreage on the -z side of the ET. 
Numerous divots appeared in a line and may be indicative of a 
spray or processing problem. Depth could not be determined due 
to the absence of shadows or stringers being visible in the 
divots. Several of the divots were estimated to be 24 inches in 
diameter. An IFA was taken against the new block of intertanks, 
which have shown an increasing trend in the appearance of 
acreage divots. 
Film analysis showed Orbiter flight performance, landing gear 
extension, wheel touchdown, drag chute deployment, and rollout 
were normal.
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The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after 
retrieval. Both frustums were missing no TPS, but had a total 
of 31 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners. Examination of the HDP #5 
stud hole revealed no obvious broaching or unusual abrasion due 
to the loss of the Debris Containment System (DCS) plunger and 
spring. The frangible nut halves were contained inside the DCS 
housing. The other DCS plungers were seated properly. None of 
the aft skirt HDP EPON shim material was lost at lift off. 
The HDP #5 DCS failure scenario suggests the frangible nut 
halves rebounded off the lead liner, symmetrically contacted 
the plunger assembly, and caused localized deformation to the 
plunger, which in turn allowed the plunger to pass through the 
stud hole. Once clear of the aft skirt/DCS housing, the plunger 
and spring became debris that could have been deflected by SRB 
plume impingement resulting in a potential threat to the 
vehicle. In this case, the frangible link connecting the 
plunger to the stud survived the launch environment. 
Although a Rockwell-MSFC study calculated low probabilities for 
DCS debris to impact flight hardware, the Shuttle program 
acknowledged the potential threat by authorizing/ funding the 
Debris Containment System. However, the study was based upon 
the size of expected ordnance debris objects (NSI cartridges 
and frangible nut webs) . The presence of a larger, more 
massive, debris object (plunger and spring) in the launch 
environment is not acceptable. The DCS plunger should be 
modified or redesigned to avoid another occurrence. 
Diagonal-cutting pliers fell out of the HDP #4 DCS area and 
were most likely wedged between the DCS housing and the RH aft 
skirt forged foot web for flight. The lost tool had been 
reported prior to launch, but no search was performed. The tool 
control plan will be changed to add specific instructions to be 
followed when a tool is reported missing or lost, final area 
inspections will be modified, and a retraining program for pad 
workers will be conducted. 
A detailed post landing inspection of OV-103 was performed 
after the KSC landing. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 156 
hits, of which 36 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. 
The Orbiter lower surface had a total of 94 hits, of which 18 
had a major dimension of one inch or greater. Based on these 
numbers and comparison to statistics from previous missions of 
similar configuration, the total number of Orbiter TPS debris 
hits was near average and the number of hits one inch or larger 
was greater than average. The largest tile damage site measured 
9.0" x 2.0" x 0.2" (involving two tiles) and was located on the 
lower surface of the RH wing leading edge extension (glove 
area) . The shallow depth of 0.2 inches is indicative of an 
impact by low density material, such as ET SOFI. 
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The tiles on the LH OHS pod leading edge sustained more damage 
than usual (at least 35 hits, of which 15 had a major dimension 
of 1 inch or greater) . Several of the tile damage sites reached 
a depth ranging from 0.5 to approximately 1.3 inches. The cause 
of this damage is believed to be ice from the waste water dump 
nozzle near the crew hatch. All three ET/Orbiter separation 
devices (EO-1, 2, and 3) and all ET/ORB umbilical separation 
ordnance retention shutters functioned properly. No flight 
hardware was found on the runway below the umbilicals when the 
ET doors were opened. 
Orbiter post landing microchemical sample results revealed a 
variety of residuals from sources such as Orbiter TPS, SRB BSM 
exhaust residue, landing site products, organics, and paint. 
New findings to this sampling effort were all obtained from the 
window samples, though the exact source of these residual items 
is still under investigation. The residual sample data do not 
indicate a single source of damaging debris since none of the 
observed materials was associated with a damage site. The 
residual sample data also showed no debris trends when compared 
to previous mission data. 
A total of 8 Post Launch Anomalies, including 2 IFA candidates, 
were observed during the STS-56 mission assessment. 
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2.0 PRE-LUJNCH BRIEFING 
The Ice/Debris/TPS/PhOtOgraphiC Analysis Team briefing for 
launch activities was conducted on 2 April 1993 at 1430 hours 
with the following key personnel present: 
B. Davis NASA - KSC STI, Ice/Debris Assessment 
G. Katnik NASA - KSC Shuttle Ice/Debris Systems 
B. Speece NASA - KSC Lead, ET Thermal Protection 
B. Bowen NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
K. Tenbusch NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
P. Rosado NASA - KSC Chief, ET Mechanical Systems 
J. Rivera NASA - KSC Lead, ET Structures 
M. Bassignani NASA - KSC ET Structures/Handling 
J. Cawby LSOC - SPC Supervisor, ET Processing 
M. Jaime LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
G. Fales LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
W. Richards LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
J. McClymonds RI	 - DNY Debris Assess, LVL II Integ 
W. Atkinson RI	 - LSS Vehicle Integration 
R. Hillard MTI	 - LSS SRM Processing 
B. Ferrell MMC	 - LSS ET Processing 
J. Phillips LSOC - SPC Safety 
C. Martin NASA - KSC Level II Representative
These personnel participated in various team activities, 
assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and 
contributed to reports contained in this document. 
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2.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION 
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle 
was conducted on 4 April 1993 from 1700-1815 hours. The 
detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 39B and MLP-1 also included the 
primary flight elements OV-103 Discovery (16th flight), ET-54 
(LWT 47), and BI-058 SRB' s. Documentary photographs were taken 
of facility anomalies, potential sources of vehicle damaging 
debris, and vehicle configuration changes. 
There were no significant vehicle anomalies or debris issues. 
Due to the continued concern over potential hydrogen leakage 
from the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical interface area during cryoload 
and launch, tygon tubes for hydrogen leak detectors LD54 and 
LD55 were installed at the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. The tygon 
tubes are intended to remain in place during cryogenic loading 
and be removed by the Ice Team during the T-3 hour hold. 
From a facility standpoint, access panel bolts on the MLP deck 
east of the RH SRB and under the raised deck between the RH and 
LH SRB's were loose. A system of marking deck bolts that have 
already been tightened/torqued was proposed to Pad Operations. 
The MLP deck, rain gutters, and areas under the raised decks 
were swept/vacuumed again prior to launch to remove small 
debris items, such as sand, rust flakes, and paint chips. 
The loose deck bolts and sweeping of the I'ilP deck were the only 
two items entered in S0007, Appendix K. 
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A conduit cap was found under the MLP raised deck
during the pre-launch debris inspection 
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Pre-launch configuration of the Hoiddown Post (HDP) #5 
Debris Containment System (DCS)-exterior view 
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3.0 ABORT 
The launch of STS-56 was aborted at T-11 seconds due to an 
instrumentation problem with the MPS LH2 high point bleed 
valve. 
3.1 ICE/FROST INSPECTION 
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was 
performed on 5 April 1993 from 2100 to 2250 hours during the 
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There 
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 violations. 
There were no conditions outside of the established data base. 
Ambient weather conditions at the time of the inspection were: 
Temperature:	 66.4 Degrees F 
Relative Humidity:	 57.9 Percent 
Wind Speed:	 12.1 Knots 
Wind Direction:	 254 Degrees 
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning 
radiometer was utilized to obtain vehicle surface temperature 
measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle, 
as shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
3.2 ORBITER 
No Orbiter TPS or RCC panel anomalies were observed. All RCS 
thruster paper covers and water spray boiler plugs were intact. 
Typical ice and frost accumulations were present at the SS! 
#1 and #2 heat shield-to-nozzle interfaces. The SSME #3 heat 
shield was wet with condensate. The base heat shield tiles were 
dry. An infrared scan revealed no unusual temperature gradients 
on the base heat shield or engine mounted heat shields. No 
unusual vapors originated from inside the SSME nozzles. 
3.3 SOLID ROT BOOSTERS 
No SRB anomalies or loose ablator/cork were observed. IPR 56V-
0105 taken against dark markings on the LH SRB case near the 
center field joint closeout appeared to be deposits of field 
joint closeout grease. The STI portable infrared scanner 
recorded RH and LH SRB case temperatures between 70 and 72 
degrees Fahrenheit (F) . In comparison, temperatures measured by 
a hand-held Minolta/Land Cyclops spot radiometer ranged from 69 
to 72 degrees F and the SRB Ground Environment Instrumentation 
(GEl) measured temperatures of 7073 degrees F. All measured 
temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum requirement. 
The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature (PT) supplied 
by MTI was 70 degrees F, which was within the required range of 
44-86 degrees F.
10
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3.4 EXTERNAL TANK 
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run 
from 1730 to 0215 hours and the results tabulated in Figure 3. 
The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost accumulation 
on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload. 
There was no condensate or ice/frost accumulations on the L02 
tank ogive. Some light condensate was present on the L02 tank 
barrel section. There were no TPS anomalies. The tumble valve 
cover was intact. The pressurization line and support ramps 
were in nominal configuration. The portable STI measured 
surface temperatures that averaged 56 degrees F on the ogive 
and 53 degrees F on the barrel section. In comparison, the 
Cyclops radiometer measured temperatures that averaged 56 
degrees F on the ogive and 52 degrees F on the barrel; SURFICE 
predicted temperatures of 58 degrees F on the ogive and 52 
degrees F on the barrel. 
The intertank acreage TPS was dry. No frost spots appeared in 
the stringer valleys at the LH2 and L02 tank-to-intertank 
flanges. Typical ice/frost accumulations and no unusual vapors 
were present on the ET umbilical carrier plate. The portable 
STI measured an average surface temperature of 66 degrees F on 
the intertank; the Cyclops measured 65 degrees F. 
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Light condensate, 
but no ice or frost, was present on the acreage and aft dome. 
In spite of the ambient weather conditions, an ice/frost line 
formed along the edge of the LH2 tank PAL ramp and three of the 
cable tray ramp aft edges. The portable STI measured surface 
temperatures that averaged 53 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank 
and 56 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank. In comparison, the 
Cyclops radiometer measured temperatures that averaged 53 
degrees F on the upper and 57 degrees on the lower LH2 tank, 
respectively; SURFICE predicted temperatures of 45 degrees F on 
the upper LH2 tank and 52 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank. 
Some ice/frost had formed in the ET/SRB cable tray-to-upper 
strut fairing expansion joints. A 6-inch crack with some 
ice/frost accumulation was present in the +Y thrust strut-to-
longeron interface. A 10-12 inch long by 1/4-inch wide crack 
was visible in the -Y vertical strut cable tray forward surface 
TPS near the longeron closeout interface. The crack exhibited 
no offset and was not filled with ice or frost. The appearance 
of the crack was expected due to the elimination of the stress 
relief gap at the factory. Ice/frost on a 3-inch crack in the 
+Z siphon manhole cover closeout was melting at the time of the 
Ice Inspection. 
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the L02 feedline 
bellows and support brackets.
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There were no TPS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. The 
purge barrier (baggie) was configured properly and was holding 
positive purge pressure. There were no accumulations of ice or 
frost on the acreage areas of the umbilical. Formation of 
ice/frost on the separation bolt pyrotechnic canister purge 
vents was typical. Normal venting of nitrogen purge gas had 
occurred during tanking, stable replenish, and launch. 
Ice/frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both 
burst disks was typical. The LH2 feedline bellows were wet with 
condensate. 
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the 
top, aft, and outboard sides of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge 
barrier. Typical ice/frost fingers had formed on the pyro 
canister and plate gap purge vents. Light ice/frost accumula-
tions were present around the aft pyrotechnic canister closeout 
due to the thin TPS closeout. A typical ice/frost ring had 
formed on the cable tray vent hole. The 17-inch flapper valve 
actuator access port foam plug was properly closed out and 
exhibited no blowing purge gas leaks or ice/frost formations. 
No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared during 
tanking, stable replenish, and launch. 
The ET/ORB hydrogen detection sensor tygon tubing was in proper 
position prior to removal. The tubing was successfully removed 
from the vehicle without contacting Orbiter tiles. 
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations /anomalies consisted 
of six OTV recorded items: 
Anomaly 001 documented a 10-12 inch long by 1/4-inch wide crack 
in the -Y vertical strut cable tray forward surface near the longeron closeout interface. The crack exhibited no offset and 
was not filled with ice or frost. The condition was acceptable 
for launch per NSTS-08303 and CR SO41254C. 
Anomaly 002 documented ice/frost lines along the LH2 tank PAL 
ramp perimeter and three of the cable tray ramp aft edges. The 
ice/frost lines were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 003 documented a 6-inch crack with some ice and frost 
accumulation in the +Y thrust strut-to-longeron interface. The 
crack with ice/frost was acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 004 documented a 3-inch crack with ice and frost 
accumulation on the aft dome +Z manhole cover closeout ring. 
The condition was acceptable per the NSTS-08303 criteria. 
Anomaly 005 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
on the ET/ORB LH2 and L02 umbilicals. The formations were 
acceptable per the NSTS-08303 criteria. 
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Anomaly 006 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
in the L02 feedline bellows and support brackets. The ice/frost 
formations were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Three more observations /anomalies were added during post drain 
surveillance: 
Anomaly 007 documented two ice/frost formations on the aft side 
of the +Y vertical strut cable tray: at the drain hole and at 
the ET acreage interface. No TPS damage was apparent. 
Anomaly 008 documented an ice/frost formation on the aft dome 
apex closeout (+Y side of the NCFI interface). Additional ice 
and frost formations occurred at the NCFI interface -Y side. No 
TPS damage was apparent. 
Anomaly 009 documented vapors emanating from an area behind the 
-Y vertical strut cable tray (between the cable tray and the 
LH2 tank). No TPS damage was apparent. 
3.5 FACILITY 
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and 
properly configured for launch. There was no debris on the MLP 
deck or in the SRB holddown post areas. 
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-0 
umbilicals. Typical amounts of ice/frost had formed on the 
cryogenic lines and purge shrouds. 
There was no apparent hydrogen leakage anywhere on the GH2 vent 
line or GUCP .  Some ice and frost, which was expected, had 
accumulated on the GUCP legs and on the uninsulated parts of 
the umbilical carrier plate. 
Visual and infrared observations of the GOX seals confirmed no 
leakage. No ET nosecone/footprint damage was visible after the 
GOX vent hood was retracted. No icicles had formed on the north 
or south GOX vent ducts.
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In spite of the warm ambient weather conditions, an ice/frost 
line formed along the edge of the LH2 tank PAL ramp. There was 
no ice or frost accumulation on the LH2 tank acreage TPS. 
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In spite of the warm ambient weather conditions, ice/frost had 
formed along the edges of three cable tray support ramps. 
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A 10-12 inch long crack occurred in the -Y vertical strut cable 
tray forward surface TPS near the longeron closeout interface. 
The 1/4-inch wide crack exhibited no offset and was not filled 
with ice or frost. The condition was acceptable for flight. 
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Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had formed on the ET/ORB 
LH2 umbilical. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had 
appeared during tanking, stable replenish, and launch. 
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The 17-inch flapper valve actuator access port TPS plug was 
properly closed out and exhibited no blowing purge gas leaks or 
ice/frost formations.
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3.6 POST DRAIN VEHICLE INSPECTION 
The launch of STS-56 was aborted due to a problem with the MPS 
LH2 high point bleed valve instrumentation. A post drain 
inspection of the vehicle was performed at Pad-39B from 0930 to 
1130 hours on 6 April 1993. 
There were no Orbiter anomalies. SSME's and T-0 umbilicals 
appeared to be in nominal configuration. All RCS thruster paper 
covers were intact. No tile damage was observed. 
There was no visible damage on the External Tank nosecone, 
fairing, or foot print area. No significant amounts of topcoat 
were missing. The tumble valve cover was intact. 
No anomalies (divots or cracks) were observed on the L02 tank, 
intertank, or LH2 tank acreage. 
Ice remained in the L02 feedline support brackets, but no loose 
foam or TPS damage was visible. Ice in the feedline bellows had 
melted. 
Bipod jack pad closeouts were intact and flush with adjacent 
L}12 tank-to-intertank flange closeout foam. 
The crack in the +Y thrust strut-to-longeron interface TPS 
closeout observed during the Ice Inspection was still visible. 
A very small crack was present in the -Y thrust strut-to-
longeron interface. 
The 12-inch crack in the -Y ET/SRB vertical strut cable tray 
forward surface TPS (reported during the Ice Inspection) was 
still visible. 
A 6-inch crack was present at the +Y vertical strut cable 
tray-to-tank interface (aft side). A 3-inch diameter ice forma-
tion was observed in this location during the Ice Inspection. 
Two cracks, both 3-4 inches in length, were located in the aft 
dome +Z siphon manhole cover BX-250 closeout near the leak 
check plug closeout. 
No SRB anomalies were observed. IPR 56V-0105 was taken earlier 
in the countdown against marks on the LH SRB forward center 
segment near the field joint closeout. Under daylight condi-
tions, the marks appeared to be grease (similar to the grease 
used in field joint closeouts), and dark scuff marks. No paint 
appeared to be missing and no metal was exposed. 
No MLP deck or launch pad anomalies were observed. No IPR's 
were generated as a result of this inspection and all TPS 
anomalies were acceptable for the next launch attempt per the 
NSTS-08303 criteria. A hands-on inspection of the L02 feedline 
brackets was not performed due to the 48 hour turnaround. 
22
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There was no visible damage on the nosecone, fairing, or foot 
print area. No significant amounts of topcoat were missing. The 
tumble valve cover was intact.
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The 12-inch crack in the -Y vertical strut cable tray forward 
surface TPS was still visible after the tank had been drained. 
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4.0 LAUNCH 
STS-56 was launched at 8:05:28:59.986 GMT (01:29 a.m. local) 
on 8 April 1993. 
4.1 ICE/FROST INSPECTION 
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was 
performed on 7 April 1993 from 2010 to 2238 hours during the 
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There 
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OS, or NSTS-08303 violations. 
One IPR was taken by CLHY against a GH2 vent line hydrogen 
leak. There were no conditions outside of the established data 
base. Ambient weather conditions at the time of the inspection 
were:
Temperature:	 65.2 Degrees F 
Relative Humidity:	 79.2 Percent 
Wind Speed:	 12.3 Knots 
Wind Direction:	 5 Degrees 
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning 
radiometer was utilized to obtain vehicle surface temperature 
measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle, 
as shown in Figures 4 and 5. 
4.2 ORBITER 
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. All water 
spray boiler plugs and RCS thruster paper covers were intact, 
though the R2U and R3R covers on the aft RCS stinger had been 
wetted by vapors. Typical ice/frost accumulations were present 
at the SS #1 and #2 heat shield-to-nozzle interfaces. Conden-
sate was present on the SS #1 and #2 heat shields, but the 
base heat shield tiles were dry. An infrared scan revealed no 
unusual temperature gradients on the base heat shield or engine 
mounted heat shields. No unusual vapors originated from inside 
the SSME nozzles. 
4.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
No SRB anomalies or loose ablator/cork were observed. The K5NA 
closeouts of the aft booster stiffener ring splice plates were 
intact. The STI portable infrared scanner recorded RH and LH 
SRB case temperatures between 67 and 71 degrees Fahrenheit (F) 
In comparison, temperatures measured by a hand-held Minolta! 
Land Cyclops spot radiometer ranged from 65 to 67 degrees F and 
the SRB Ground Environment Instrumentation (GEl) measured 
temperatures ranging from 65 to 67 degrees F. All measured 
temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum requirement. 
The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature (PT) supplied 
by MTI was 68 degrees F, which was within the required range of 
44-86 degrees 
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FIGURE 4. SSV INFRARED SCANNER 
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4.4 EXTERNAL TANK 
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run 
from 1730 to 0130 hours and the results tabulated in Figure 6. 
The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost accumulation 
on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload. 
There was light condensate, but no ice/frost accumulations, on 
the L02 tank. There were no TPS anomalies. The tumble valve 
cover was intact. The portable STI measured surface tempera-
tures that averaged 64 degrees F on the ogive and 62 degrees F 
on the barrel section. In comparison, the Cyclops radiometer 
measured temperatures that averaged 58 degrees F on the ogive 
and 56 degrees F on the barrel; SURFICE predicted temperatures 
of 56 degrees F on the ogive and 53 degrees F on the barrel. 
No frost spots appeared in the intertank stringer valleys at 
the LH2 and L02 tank-to-intertank flanges. Typical ice/frost 
accumulations and no unusual vapors were present on the ET 
umbilical carrier plate. The portable STI measured an average 
surface temperature of 67 degrees F on the intertank compared 
to 64 degrees as measured by the Cyclops radiometer. 
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Light condensate, 
but no ice or frost, was present on the acreage and aft dome. 
The portable STI measured surface temperatures that averaged 58 
degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 62 degrees F on the lower 
LH2 tank. In comparison, the Cyclops radiometer measured 
temperatures that averaged 56 degrees F on both the upper and 
lower LH2 tank; SURPICE predicted temperatures of 50 degrees F 
on the upper LH2 tank and 55 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank. 
There were no anomalies on the bipod jack pad closeouts. Two 
pressurization line ramps exhibited ice/frost along the ramp to 
ET acreage interface. Some ice/frost was present in the ET/SRB 
cable tray-to-upper strut fairing expansion joints. 
Six-inch cracks with some ice/frost accumulation were present 
in both the -Y and fY thrust strut-to-longeron interfaces. A 
4-inch crack along the aft edge of the -Y vertical strut cable 
tray TPS had not changed since the first cryoload. Two 3-inch 
cracks in the +Z siphon manhole cover closeout had not changed. 
A 12 inch long crack in the -Y vertical strut cable tray 
forward surface TPS near the longeron closeout interface 
(previously observed during the first cryoload) had increased 
in length. A 4-inch crack, propagating outboard from the ET 
interface, was most likely a continuation of the forward 
surface 12-inch crack along the inboard side of the vertical 
strut/cable tray. The 4-inch crack exhibited some offset, which 
was caused by structural deflection rather than a TPS debond. 
The appearance of the crack was expected due to the elimination 
of the stress relief gap at the factory and was acceptable for 
flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria. 
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Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the L02 feedline 
bellows and support brackets. 
There were no TPS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. The 
purge barrier (baggie) was configured properly and was holding 
positive purge pressure. There were no accumulations of 
ice/frost on the acreage areas of the umbilical. Formation of 
ice/frost on the separation bolt pyrotechnic canister purge 
vents was typical. Normal venting of nitrogen purge gas had 
occurred during tanking, stable replenish, and launch. 
Ice/frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both 
burst disks was typical. The LH2 feedline bellows were wet with 
condensate and some frost was beginning to form. 
Less than usual amounts of ice and frost had accumulated on the 
top, aft, and outboard sides of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge 
barrier. Typical ice/frost fingers were present on the pyro 
canister and plate gap purge vents. A typical ice/frost ring 
had formed on the cable tray vent hole. No ice/frost had formed 
on the 17-inch flapper valve actuator access port foam plug 
closeout. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared 
during tanking, stable replenish, and launch. 
The ET/ORB hydrogen detection sensor tygon tubing had not been 
re-installed during the 48 hour scrub turnaround. 
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations /anomalies consisted 
of nine OTV recorded items: 
Anomaly 001 documented a 12-inch long by 1/4-inch wide crack in 
the -Y vertical strut cable tray forward surface TPS near the 
].ongeron interface. The crack exhibited no offset and was not 
filled with ice or frost. The condition was acceptable for 
launch per NSTS-08303 and CR SO41254C. 
Anomaly 002 documented ice/frost accumulations along the aft 
edges of LH2 tank cable tray PAL ramps and pressurization line 
support ramps. The ice/frost accumulations were acceptable per 
NSTS-0 8303. 
Anomaly 003 documented a crack with ice/frost formation at the 
+Y thrust strut-to-longeron interface; ice/frost formation on 
the adjacent longeron foam. These formations were acceptable 
per the NSTS-08303 criteria. 
Anomaly 004 documented ice/frost formations on the +Z manhole 
cover closeout and aft dome +Y apex bondline. The formations 
were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 005 recorded (documentation only) typical ice and frost 
accumulations on the ET/ORB LH2 and L02 umbilicals.	 - 
31
Anomaly 006 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
in the L02 feedline bellows and support brackets. The ice and 
frost formations were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 007 documented a 4-inch crack with ice/frost formation 
along the aft edge of the +Y vertical strut cable tray TPS-to-
ET acreage interface. The formation was acceptable per NSTS-
08303. 
Anomaly 008 documented ice/frost accumulations on the LH2 
tank-to-intertank flange closeout bondline and in stringer root 
areas. The accumulations were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 009 documented a 4-inch crack on the aft side of the -Y 
vertical strut cable tray TPS surface. The crack, which is 
believed to be a continuation of the crack on the forward 
surface, was not filled with ice or frost. An observed offset 
was caused by structural deflection and was not the result of 
TPS debonding. The condition was acceptable per the NSTS-08303 
criteria.
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4.5 FACILITY 
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and 
properly configured for launch. There was no debris on the MLP 
deck or in the SRB holddown post areas. 
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-O 
umbilicals. Typical amounts of ice and frost had formed on the 
cryogenic lines and purge shrouds. 
There was no apparent hydrogen leakage at the GUCP. Some ice 
and frost, which was expected, had accumulated on the GUC? legs 
and on the uninsulated parts of the umbilical carrier plate. 
Venting vapors and an ice/frost buildup at the GH2 vent line 90 
degree elbow/flex line flange (covered by an ice shroud) indi-
cated the possible presence of a hydrogen leak. The possibility 
was confirmed by use of a hydrogen detection meter, which gave 
readings of at least 4 percent concentration. Since the leaking 
hydrogen was not driven by a pressurized GH2 vent line, and the 
line itself would be purged at T-90 seconds, the condition was 
not considered a constraint to launch. The ice buildup measured 
10" x 4" x 3/8" thick and may have been a debris threat to 
Orbiter tiles. However, the easterly winds and the structurally 
enclosed area of the ice buildup would prevent large pieces of 
ice from falling toward the vehicle. 
Visual and infrared observations of the GOX seals confirmed no 
leakage. No ET nosecone/footprint damage was visible after the 
GOX vent hood was retracted. Small icicles less than 1/2 inch 
in length had formed on both GOX vent ducts, but had melted 
prior to the time of launch.
33
Typical ice/frost accumulations were present at the SSrW #1 and 
#2 heat shield-to-nozzle interfaces. The R3R aft RCS thruster 
paper cover had been wetted by vapors. 
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Light condensate, but no ice oi frost, was present n t tie L02 
and LH2 tanks. There were no acreage TPS anomalies. 
:v 
Typical amounts of ice/frost had formed in the L02 feedline 
bellows and support brackets. Note ice/frost ball on aft edge 
of pressurization line support.
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The 12-inch long crack in the LH (-Y) vertical strut cable tray 
forward surface TPS (previously observed during the first cryo 
load) had increased in length. The appearance of the crack was 
expected due to the elimination of the stress relief cut. 
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A 4-inch crack, propagating outboard from the ET interface, was 
most likely a continuation of the forward surface 12-inch crack 
along the inboard edge of the vertical strut/cable tray. The 4 
inch crack exhibited some offset, which was caused by struc-
tural deflection rather than a TPS debond. Note ice formation 
over small TFS defect or thermal short on aft surface of strut 
TPS.
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Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had formed on the ET/ORB 
LH2 umbilical. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had 
appeared during tanking, stable replenish, and launch.
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The 17-inch flapper valve actuator access port TPS plug was 
properly closed out and exhibited no blowing purge gas leaks or 
ice/frost formations.
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A hydLogen leak at the GH2 vent line elbow/flex line flange was 
detected by the on-pad Ice Team. The visual signs of venting 
vapors and ice/frost buildup showed the exit point from the ice 
shroud. The line was depressurized and purged prior to launch. 
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5.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The post launch inspection of the MLP, FSS and RSS was 
conducted on 8 April 1993 from Launch + 5 to 6-1/2 hours. 
A plunger, spring, and associated hardware from the Debris 
Containment System (DCS) was found on hoiddown post #5 still 
attached to the stud. This hardware is normally contained in 
the DCS housing and remains with the SRB aft skirt during 
flight. No TPS materials or other flight hardware were found. 
SRB holddown post (HDP) erosion was less than usual. All south 
HDP shoe shim material was intact, but slightly debonded at the 
sidewalls of HDP #1 and #2. In addition, three small pieces of 
material were missing from the HDP #5 inboard sidewall shim. 
There was no visual indication of a stud hang-up on any of the 
south hoiddown posts. There were no ordnance fragments found in 
the south holddown post stud holes. All of the north HDP 
doghouse blast covers were in the closed position and exhibited 
typical erosion. The SRB aft skirt purge lines were in place, 
but slightly damaged. The SRB T-0 umbilicals exhibited minor 
damage. 
The GOX vent arm, OAA, and TSM's showed only minor damage. The 
GH2 vent line appeared to have retracted nominally. The line 
was latched on the eighth tooth of the latching mechanism and 
had no loose cables (static retract lanyard). The GH2 vent line 
showed typical signs of SRB plume impingement. The ET inter-
tank access structure also sustained typical plume heating 
effects. 
Post launch inspection of the GH2 vent line 90 degree 
elbow/flex line and flange ice shroud, where the hydrogen leak 
occurred during cryogenic stable replenish, revealed to visual 
anomalies. Disassembly of the flange revealed the old 
Flurorgreen gasket, which was cracked, had not been removed 
prior to installation of the new Fluorogold gasket. In 
addition, the flange bolts had not been re-torqued after the 
last cryogenic loading cycle. 
Damage to the facility included: 
1. Three loose or detached cable tray covers on the RSS 
207 foot level. 
2. Loose FSS 235 foot sign on the west wall of the 
elevator structure. 
All seven emergency egress slidewire baskets were secured on 
the FSS 195 foot level and sustained no launch damage. 
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An inspection of the beach from UCS-10 to Titan complex 40, the 
beach road, the railroad tracks, the water areas around the pad 
and under the flight path was completed. No flight hardware was 
found. 
MLP-1 was configured with overpressure sensors at the top of 
both TSM's, at the bottom of both SRB exhaust holes, and at the 
bottom of the SSME exhaust hole. All sensor readings were 
consistent with previous launches and within nominal limits. 
Patrick AFB and MILA radars were configured in a mode for 
increased sensitivity for the purpose of observing any debrià 
falling from the vehicle during ascent but after SRB separation 
(due to the masking effect of the SRB exhaust plume). Most of 
the signal registrations were very weak and often barely detec-
table, which generally compares with the types of particles 
detected on previous Shuttle flights. A total of 47 particles 
were imaged in the T+140 to T+311 second time period. Twelve of 
the particles were imaged by only one radar, 21 particles were 
imaged by two radars, and 14 particles were imaged by all three 
radars. Though the signal strength of the detected particles 
was comparable to previous missions, the number of detected 
particles was distinctly lower than that of previous Shuttle 
missions. 
Post launch pad inspection anomalies are listed in Section 10. 
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A plunger, spring, and associated hardware from the Debris 
Containment System (DCS) was found on hoiddown post #5 still 
attached to the stud. This hardware is normally contained in 
the DCS housing and remains with the SRB aft skirt for flight. 
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6.0 FILM REVIEW AND PROBLEM REPORTS 
Post Launch Anomalies observed in the Film Review were 
presented to the Mission Management Team, Shuttle Managers, and 
vehicle systems engineers. These anomalies are listed in 
Section 10. 
Due to the Debris Containment System (DCS) plunger anomaly, 
retrieval of the camera film that views Hoiddown Post #5 had 
been expedited. Examination of the camera revealed the film 
had jammed just after camera start and no film data was 
recovered. A total of four launch cameras experienced hardware 
malfunctions or film breaks. 
6.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUNMPRY 
A total of 101 film and video data items, which included forty 
videos, thirty-six 16mm films, twenty-one 35mm films, and four 
70mm films, were reviewed starting on launch day. 
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed 
that would have affected the mission. 
During SSME startup, free burning hydrogen drifted under the 
body flap. SSME ignition, Mach diamond formation, and gimbal 
profile appeared normal (RSS STI, C/S-2 STI, OTV 151, 163, 170, 
171). Several debris-induced flashes occurred in the plume of 
SS	 #3 prior to liftoff (E-2, 3, 5, 19). 
SSME ignition vibration/acoustics caused the loss of tile 
surface coating material from four places on the base heat 
shield (E-17, 20) and one place on the body flap near SS #3 
(E-19) 
A thin, rectangular, dark object (possibly a tile gap filler or 
GSE tile shim/spacer) originated from the LH aft RCS stinger 
tiles (edge of the aft surface) on film items E-20, 77. 
Fore-and-aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the 
centerline area between the SSME cluster occurred during engine 
startup. The motion was similar to that observed on previous 
launches (E-76, 77). 
SSME ignition caused ice/frost to fall from the ET/Orbiter 
umbilicals. Several pieces of ice appeared to contact lower 
surface tiles near the umbilical cavity sill. Ice from the top 
side of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical bounced off of the cable tray 
and contacted Orbiter lower surface tiles. No damage was 
visible in both cases. There were no unusual vapors or 
cryogenic drips from the ET/ORB umbilicals during tanking, 
stable replenish, ignition, liftoff, or tower clear (OTV 109, 
150, 154, 163, 164, E-5, 6, 25) 
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The tumble valve cover was intact. Light frost was present in 
the ET GOX vent louvers. There was no TPS damage to the ET nose 
cone acreage, footprint, or fairing. (OTV 113, 160, 161, 162). 
ET "twang" was typical (E-79). 
The Orbiter LH2 and L02 T-0 umbilicals disconnected and 
retracted properly (OTV 149, 150, 163). Separation of the GUCP 
from the ET was nominal. The GH2 vent line retracted and 
latched normally with no rebound (OTV 104, E-33). No unexpected 
slack in the static retract lanyard was present during retrac-
tion. More vapors than usual emanated from the vent line 
disconnect after separation. Lack of lighting at the vent line 
hinge, area prevented observation of the hydrogen leak and ice 
formation at the line elbow/flex line flange (E-41, 42, 48, 
50) 
No film data of the HDP #5 DCS plunger anomaly was obtained due 
to the E-12 film breakage. No other MLP or FSS films viewed the 
HDP #5 area. However, several films viewing the Orbiter lower 
surface showed no unidentified debris objects moving toward the 
Orbiter from the LH SRB aft skirt area and no obvious tile 
damage from debris impacts. 
No stud hang-ups occurred on any of the hoiddown posts. No 
debris was visible falling from any of the aft skirt HDP 
DCS/stud holes. Film E-9, frame 4016, showed a thin, rectan-
gular, silver colored object (possibly a piece of duct tape) 
drawn toward the SSNE exhaust hole by aspiration. 
Film item E-60 confirmed that water flowed properly from all 
MLP rainbirds. 
Several pieces of ice from the L02 feedline upper bellows fell 
aft, but did not appear to contact Orbiter tiles (OTV 161, 166, 
E-5, 6, 34, 40) 
Two debris objects appeared over the SSME flame trench south of 
the vehicle after liftoff: 1) dark piece (E-63, frame 975) may 
be a piece of SRB throat plug material; 2) square, metallic 
object (E-63, frame 1191) may be a facility cable tray cover. 
Numerous debris objects (pieces of SRB throat plug) appeared 
over the SB.B flame trench north of the vehicle after SRB 
ignition (OTV 133, TV-4B, TV-7, E-62, 222) 
White flashes occurred in the SSME plume during and after the 
roll maneuver (OTV 141, ET-207, E-52, 54, 57, 207, 212, 218) . A 
large, orange flash, typically induced by debris, occurred in 
the SSME plume during ascent (E-205, frame 1298; E-223, frames 
2857 and 4432) . 
Pieces of the ET/ORB umbilical purge barriers (baggies) fell 
aft following the roll maneuver and were caught in the plume 
recirculation (E-52, 220, 223)
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Clusters of particles falling aft of the Orbiter after 
completion of the roll maneuver were traced to the forward RCS 
thrusters and were pieces of RCS paper covers (E-212, 220, 
222) 
A light colored particle appeared below the right wing near the 
middle of the inboard elevon at GMT 49:05:29:18.612 and may 
have been a paper cover from the forward RCS thrusters (E-59, 
213) . The light colored object was also visible in E-57, 
05:29:18.611 GMT; E-224, 05:29:17.563; and E-223, frame 1920. 
A light colored object first appeared forward of the RH wing at 
05:29:45.349 GMT and fell aft of the vehicle. The object may 
have been a piece of SRB propellant dropping out of the SRB 
plume and appeared in this location due to the angle of view by 
the ground camera (E-224). 
Numerous small particles, most likely pieces of SRB propellant, 
dropped out of the SRB plumes almost continuously during ascent 
(TV-5, TV-21B, ET-207, E-52, 57, 59, 207, 208, 220, 224) 
There were numerous views 
under the RH SRB aft skirt 
Film item 223 showed two 
falling aft at frames 3786 
Movement of the body fla 
(E-207, 212)
of the loose thermal curtain tape 
near the HOP #4 foot (E-57, 60, 62). 
pieces of the thermal curtain tape 
and 4655. 
p was similar to previous flights 
Exhaust plume recirculation appeared typical. SRB plume tailoff 
and separation appeared normal. Numerous pieces of slag fell 
out of the SRB plume before, during, and after SRB separation 
from the ET (TV-13, ET-207, ET-208, ET-212, E-207, 208, 212) 
SRB parachute cameras E-301 and 302 were not, run due to dark 
conditions.
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A thin, rectangular object, most likely a tile gap filler or 
GSE shim/spacer, originated from the left aft RCS stinger tiles 
(edge of the aft surface) fell during SSME ignition. 
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A large, orange flash, typically induced by debris, occurred 
in the SSME plume during ascent 
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6.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
DTO-0312 was performed by the flight crew and seventy 35mm 
still images were obtained of the External Tank (-Z side) after 
separation from the Orbiter. OV-103 was not equipped to carry 
umbilical cameras. 
ET separation from the Orbiter appeared nominal. No structural 
damage was visible. The BSM burn scars on the L02 tank were 
typical. No anomalies were observed on the nosecone, L02 tank 
acreage, LH2 tank acreage, aft hard point, and aft dome 
acreage. 
As many as 12 divots were present in the LH2 tank-to-intertank 
flange closeout on the ET -z side. Some of the divots were 
10-12 inches in diameter. 
As many as 11 divots were also visible in the intertank acreage 
on the -z side of the ET. Numerous divots appeared in a line 
and may be indicative of a spray or processing problem. Depth 
could not be determined due to the absence of shadows or 
stringers being visible in the divots. Several of the divots 
were estimated to be 24 inches in diameter. An IFA was taken 
against the new block of intertanks, which have shown an 
increasing trend in the appearance of acreage divots. 
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1ve11 dIv.5 Wet 	 L11 Liie intertank acreage on the ET 
-z side. Numerous divots appeared in a line and may be indica-
tive of a spray or processing problem. Depth could not be 
determined, but several of the divots were estimated to be 24 
inches in diameter. Twelve divots, some of which were 10-12 
inches in diameter, occurred in the -z LH2 tank-to-intertank 
flange closeout.
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6.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
A total of 27 landing films and videos, which included six 16mm 
high speed films, nine 35mm large format films, and twelve 
videos, were reviewed. 
Orbiter performance in the Heading Alignment Circle (HAC) and 
on final approach appeared nominal. The landing gear extended 
properly. Infrared views of the Orbiter on final approach 
showed as many as six Ames gap fillers falling from the nose 
landing gear area when the doors were opened. The gap fillers 
had been inserted, into gaps after the nose gear doors were 
closed to prevent re-entry heat intrusion. The appearance of 
the gap fillers is an expected occurrence. 
The Orbiter touched down on the runway near the 1000 foot 
marker. Left and right main landing gear contact with the 
runway was almost simultaneous. 
The drag chute was deployed just after breakover, but before 
the nose gear touched down on the runway. Operation of the 
drag chute appeared nominal though the parachute riser lines 
contacted the vertical stabilizer "stinger" and damaged three 
tiles. The drag chute stayed close to the Orbiter centerline 
and did not cause the Orbiter to yaw or deviate from the runway 
centerline during rollout. 
Touchdown of the nose landing gear was smooth. There were no 
anomalies during rollout. However, damage to two tiles on the 
lower surface of the RH wing leading edge extension was 
visible.
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7.0 SRB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
Both Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and 
debris sources at CCAFS Hangar AF on 10 April 1993 from 0830 to 
1030 hours. 
7.1 RH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The RH frustum was missing no TPS, but had 11 MSA-2 debonds 
over fasteners (Figure 7). Significant blistering of the 
Hypalon paint top layer had occurred in an area between the -Y 
and +Y axes from the BSM's to the 395 ring frame. No sooting or 
charring was visible in the open paint blisters and on the 
Hypalon basecoat. All BSM aero heatshield covers were locked in 
the fully opened position, although the two right cover attach 
rings had been bent by parachute riser entanglement. 
The RH forward skirt acreage MSA-2 exhibited two debonds (3 and 
1.5 inches in diameter, respectively) near the ET/SRB attach 
fitting. A 5" x 3" piece of MSA-2 was missing from an area near 
the ET/SRB attach fitting, but the substrate was not sooted. 
Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic base plates were intact 
(Figure 8). Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred on 
the systems tunnel cover and around the ET/SRB attach point. No 
pins were missing from the frustum severance ring. The forward 
separation bolt appeared to have separated cleanly. 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were 
generally in good condition. Minor trailing edge damage to the 
FJPS and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting 
from severance of the nozzle extension. White topcoat, ap-
proximately 2.5 feet in circumferential length, was blistered/ 
missing from the aft field joint closeout. 
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB 
aft struts, ETA ring, lEA, and lEA covers appeared undamaged. 
K5NA closeout material, 5" x 1" in size, was missing from the 
upper strut fairing. All three aft booster stiffener rings also 
appeared undamaged. The aft booster stiffener ring splice plate 
closeouts were intact and no K5NA material was missing. 
The phenolic material on the kick ring was delaminated. The 
K5NA closeouts (protective domes) on the kick ring forward and 
aft fasteners are no longer used. RTV-133 has replaced the K5NA 
over the forward fasteners. The aft skirt acreage TPS was 
generally in good condition (Figure 9). 
None of the aft skirt HDP EPON shim material was lost prior to 
splashdown. All four Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers 
were seated properly.
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The RE frustum was missing no TPJ, but had 11 MSA-2 debonds 
over fasteners. Significant blistering of the Hypalon paint top 
layer had occurred in an area around and aft of the BSM's. 
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The RH forward skirt acreage MSA-2 exhibited two debonds near 
the ET/SRB attach fitting. A 5 1l x3" piece of MSA-2 was missing, 
'	 but the substrate was not sooted. Both RSS antenna covers/TPS 
were intact.
58
ORIGINAL PAGE 
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
kLA 
.4004 
1
Overall view of the SRN segment L'ases 
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K5NA, 5"xl" in size, was missing from the upper strut fairing
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7.2 LH SOLID ROT BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The LH frustum was missing no TPS, but had a total of 20 MSA-2 
debonds (Figure 10). Minor localized blistering of the Hypalon 
paint had occurred along the 395 ring. The BSM aero heat shield 
covers were locked in the fully opened position. 
The LH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Both 
RSS antennae covers/phenolic base plates were intact. Minor 
blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred near the ETISRB attach 
point and on the systems tunnel cover (Figure 11) . No pins were 
missing from the frustum sverance ring. The forward separation 
bolt appeared to have separated cleanly. 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were in good 
condition. In general, minor' trailing edge damage to the FJPS 
and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from 
severance of the nozzle extension. The dark marks observed on 
the aft center segment during the launch countdown (IPR 
56V-0105) were still visible and appeared to be field joint 
closeout, grease. 
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB 
aft struts, ETA ring, lEA, and lEA covers appeared undamaged. 
K5NA closeout material, 2" x 1.5" in size, was missing from the 
upper strut fairing. All three aft booster stiffener rings 
appeared undamaged. The stiffener ring splice plate closeouts 
were intact and no K5NA material was missing. 
The phenolic material on the kick ring was delarninated in only 
localized areas. The K5NA closeouts (protective domes) on the 
kick ring forward and aft fasteners are no longer used. RTV-133 
has replaced the K5NA over the forward fasteners. The aft skirt 
acreage TPS was generally in good condition (Figure 12). 
Examination of the Hoiddown Post 45 stud hole revealed no 
obvious broaching or unusual abrasion due to the loss of the 
Debris Containment System (DCS) plunger/spring. The frangible 
nut halves were contained inside the DCS housing. The amount of 
debris lost from the DCS will be determined during the post 
flight disassembly. The other three DCS plungers were seated 
properly. None of the aft skirt HDP EPON shim material was lost 
prior to splashdown.
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The LH frustum was missing no TPS, but had a total of 20 MSA-2 
debonds. The BSM aero heat shield covers were locked in the 
fully opened position.
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Dark marks on the LH SRB aft center segment during the launch 
countdown were still visible and appeared to be field joint 
closeout grease.
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Post flight condition of the aft booster and aft skirt. The 
ET/SRB aft struts, ETA ring, lEA, lEA covers, and aft booster 
stiffener rings appeared undamaged. 
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Examination of the HDF #5 stud hole revealed no obvious 
broaching or unusual abrasions due to the loss of the Debris 
Containment System (DCS) plunger/spring. The frangible nut 
halves were contained in the DCS housing. 
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7.3 RECOVERED SRB DISASSEMBLY FINDINGS 
Significant blistering of the Hypalori paint top layer had 
occurred on the RH frustum in an area between the -Y and +Y 
axes from the BSM's to the 395 ring frame. No sooting or 
charring was visible in the open paint blisters or on the 
Hypalon basecoat. Although Hypalon blistering is an accepted 
condition over MTA per 10L-0035, SRB Post Flight Assessment 
Manual, significant blistering over MSA-2 had not occurred 
previously and was squawked (56-004). Pre-flight documentation 
showed a solvent and phenolic microballoon mixture had been 
spilled during processing. The blistering was the result of 
subsequent cleaning and application of an additional layer of 
Hypalon topcoat over a fully cured Hypalon basecoat (reference 
USBI Report No. RWR-045-93', dated 17 May 1993). 
The RH forward skirt acreage MSA-2 exhibited two debonds (3 and 
1.5 inches in diameter, respectively) near the ET/SRB attach 
fitting. The two debonds were dissected in place and no 
evidence was found to suggest the deborids were a pre-flight 
condition. The MSA-2 had failed cohesively within the MSA-2 and 
there appeared to be adequate adhesion of MSA-2 to substrate. 
USBI Report No. RWR-046-93, dated 17 May 1993, concluded the 
two debonds were random occurrences and were the combined 
result of pressure changes during descent and the tendency of 
the porous MSA-2 to vent. 
STS-56 was the fourteenth flight to utilize the new "optimized" 
frangible links in the hoiddown post DCS's. The link was 
designed to increase the DCS plunger velocity and improve the 
seating alignment while leaving the stud ejection velocity the 
same. The design was intended to prevent ordnance debris from 
falling out of the DCS yet not increase the likelihood of a 
stud hang-up. According to NSTS-07700, the Debris Containment 
System should retain a minimum of 90 percent of the ordnance 
debris. 
A recent change to the disassembly procedures by SRB Project 
(DCN 009 1OMNL-0035) eliminated the weighing of frangible nut 
pieces and ordnance fragments in the DCS containers unless: 
1) debris is observed in the launch films 
2) the DCS plunger has an anomalous appearance during 
disassembly 
3) visual inspection of the expected DCS contents 
reveals the absence of any pieces 
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Due to the HDP #5 DCS plunger anomaly, the contents of DCS #5 
(discrepant) and DCS #6 (control) housings were weighed, A 
total of 0.707 pounds of debris were lost from the HDP #5 DCS 
compared to 0.020 pounds from the HDP #6 DCS. 
% of Nut without	 % of Ordnance 
HDP #
	
2 Large Halves	 Fragments	 % Overall 
5	 52	 56	 53 
6	 99	 98	 99 
The current failure scenario suggests the frangible nut halves 
rebounded off the lead liner, symmetrically contacted the 
plunger assembly, and caused localized deformation to the 
plunger, which in turn allowed the plunger to pass through the 
stud hole (ref Figure 13). Once clear of the aft skirt/DCS 
housing, the plunger and spring became debris that could have 
been deflected by SRB plume impingement resulting in a 
potential threat to the vehicle. In this case, the frangible 
link connecting the plunger to the stud survived the launch 
environment. 
Although a Rockwell-MSFC study calculated low probabilities for 
DCS debris to impact flight hardware, the Shuttle program 
acknowledged the potential threat by authorizing/ funding the 
Debris Containment System. However, the study was based upon 
the size of expected ordnance debris objects (NSI cartridges 
and frangible nut webs) . The presence of a larger, more 
massive, debris object (plunger and spring) in the launch 
environment is not acceptable. Should this failure occur again, 
the DCS plunger may have to be modified or redesigned. 
Diagonal-cutting pliers fell out of the HDP #4 DCS area and 
were most likely wedged between the DCS housing and the RB aft 
skirt forged foot web for flight. The lost tool had been 
reported prior to launch, but no search was performed. The tool 
control plan will be changed to add specific instructions to be 
followed when a tool is reported missing or lost, final area 
inspections will be modified, and a retraining program for pad 
workers will be conducted. 
SRB Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 10. 
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Flgure 13. DEBRIS CONTAINMENT SYSTEM (DCS) 
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View showing frangible nut halves symmetrically contacting a 
DCS plunger assembly/hole plugger test article. The points of 
contact on the flight article had been materially deformed 
allowing the hole plugger/spring to exit the stud hole. 
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8.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
A post landing debris inspection of OV-103 (Discovery) was 
conducted 17-18 April 1993 at the Kennedy Space Center on 
Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) runway 33 and in the Orbiter 
Processing Facility bay #3. This inspection was performed to 
identify debris impact damage and, if possible, debris sources. 
The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 156 hits, of which 36 had 
a major dimension of one inch or greater. This total does not 
include the numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to 
SSME vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume recirculation. A 
comparison of these numbers to statistics from 38 previous 
missions of similar configuration (excluding missions STS-23, 
24, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 30R, and 42, which had damage from known 
debris sources), indicates that the total number of hits is 
near average and the number of hits one inch or larger is 
greater than average (reference Figures 14-17) 
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 94 hits, of 
which 18 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. The 
distribution of hits on the lower surface does not suggest a 
single source of ascent debris, but indicates a shedding of ice 
and Thermal Protection System (TPS) debris from random sources. 
The following table breaks down the STS-56 Orbiter debris 
damage by area:
HITS > 1"	 TOTAL HITS 
Lower surface 18 94 
Upper surface 2 23 
Right side 0 0 
Left	 side 0 0 
Right OMS Pod 1 4 
Left	 OMS Pod 15 35 
TOTALS 36 156
The largest tile damage site measured 9.0" x 2.0" x 0.2" 
(involving two tiles) and was located on the lower surface of 
the RH wing leading edge extension (glove area). The shallow 
depth of 0.2 inches is indicative of an impact by low density 
material, such as ET SOFI. 
Four tiles, roughly in a fore-to-aft line on the Orbiter lower 
surface opposite the ET L02 feedline sustained damage to a 
depth of 0.5 inches, or greater, that may be indicative of 
impacts from higher density materials, such as ice. 
A loose gap filler was visible at the aft lower right corner of 
the body flap. Protrusion of the gap filler into the air flow 
caused some fusing of the material to an adjacent tile OML. 
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FIGURE 14. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
7 Hits < 1 inch 
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9 Hits with 
1 > 1 inch: 
1.3 x .5 x	 .3 
1.5 x
	 .7 x .2 
4.0 x 2.5 x 1.3 
1.3 x
	 .4 x	 .2 
1.5 x
	 .7 x	 .1 
x	 .6 x	 .5 
-1.3 x	 .7 x	 .3 
3.3 x	 .8 x	 .5 
9.0 x 2.0 x
	 .2 
(INVOLVES 2 TILES) 
TOTAL HITS = 
HITS >1 INCH 18 
ALL DIMENSIONS 
IN INCHES
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FIGURE 15. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
TOTAL HITS " 0 
HITS >I INCH ". 0 
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FIGURE 16. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
STS-56 
FIGURE 17. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
3 x 2.5 x 0.75
ø''35 Hits with 
15 > 1 inch on 
OMS Pod Leading 
Edge: 
1.5 x 1 x 0.25 
1.25 x-1 x 0.375 
1 x 0.375 x 0.25 
2 x 0.75 x 0.75 
3 x 1.375 x 1 
1 x 0.75 x 0.5 
1.25 x 1 x 0.75 
2 x 0.75 x 1.25 
1.25 x 0.5 x 0.25 
1.25 x 0.5 x 0.375 
2.5 x 0.75 x0.375 
1 x 0.75 x 0.25 
2 x 0.375 x 0.25 
1 x 0.75 x 0.25 
3 x 0.5 x 0.25 
TOTAL HITS 62 
	
1.75 x 0.375 x O.125_4
	 ii	 I	 HITS >1 INCH 18 
3 Hits < 1 inch -  
ALL DIMENSIONS 
IN INCHES 1.5 x 0.5 x 0.125	
Hits < 3 Hits < 1 inch 1 inch 
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No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels, 
tires, or brakes. The main landing gear tires were considered 
to be in good condition for a landing on the KSC runway. 
All three ET/Orbiter separation devices (EQ-I, 2, 3) appeared 
to have functioned properly. All ET/Orbiter umbilical separa-
tion ordnance retention shutters were closed properly. No 
flight hardware was found on the runway below the umbilicals 
when the ET doors were opened. 
Orbiter windows #3 and #4 exhibited moderate hazing. Only a 
very light haze was present the other windows. Some streaks 
were visible on window #3 and #4. Surface wipes were taken from 
all windows for laboratory analysis (Figure 18). 
Tile damage on the base heat shield was typical. A ring tile 
insert was missing/damaged on the SSME #1 engine mounted heat 
shield 6:30 o'clock position. Numerous, but small, areas of 
tile surface coating material were missing on the +Z side of 
the body flap along the hinge line. The SSME Dome Mounted Heat 
Shield (DMMS) closeout blanket sacrificial panels were intact 
and in excellent condition. 
The tiles on the LH OMS pod leading edge sustained more damage 
than usual (at least 35 hits, of which 15 had a major dimension 
of 1 inch or greater). Several of the tile damage sites reached 
a depth ranging from 0.5 to approximately 1.25 inches. The 
cause of this damage is believed to be ice from the waste water 
dump nozzle near the crew hatch. STS-53 was the last mission to 
sustain greater than average tile damage on the LH OMS pod 
leading edge (27 hits total; 10 hits 1-inch or greater). 
Runway 33 had been swept/inspected by SLF operations personnel 
prior to landing and all potentially damaging debris was 
removed. 
The post landing wa].kdown of Runway 33 was performed 
immediately after landing. Two pieces of Q-felt plug, most 
likely from the base heat shield, were found along the runway 
centerline at the 5010 foot marker. No organic (bird) debris or 
non-flight hardware was found on the runway. 
Eight pieces of black tile, the largest of which measured 5.25" 
x 1.25" x 1.0 11 , were recovered between the 5400 to 8080 foot 
runway markers. These tile fragments originated from the 
rudder/speed brake "stinger", which is an area damaged on 
previous uses of the drag chute by contact with the parachute 
riser lines. This flight marked the seventh use of the Orbiter 
drag chute. Aside from the damage to the vertical stabilizer 
stinger, the drag chute appeared to have functioned nominally. 
All drag chute hardware was recovered and appeared to be in 
good condition (Figure 19).
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FIGURE 18.CHEMICAL SAMPLE LOCATIONS
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A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) was used to measure the 
surface temperatures of three areas on the Orbiter (per O!,SD 
V09AJO.095). Ten minutes after landing, the Orbiter nosecap RCC 
was 202 degrees Fahrenheit (F). Twenty minutes after landing, 
the RH wing leading edge RCC panel #9 was 102 degrees F and 
panel #17 was 97 degrees F (Figure 20). 
In summary, the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits was 
near average and the number of hits one inch or larger was 
greater than average when compared to previous missions 
(Figures 21-22) 
Orbiter Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 10. 
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FIGURE 20.	 56RCC TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS AS 
RECORDED BY THE SHUTTLE THERMAL IMAGER 
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FIGURE  21. ORBITER POST FLIGHT DEBRIS DAMAGE SUMMARY 
LOWER SURFACE ENTIRE VEHICLE 
HITS> 1 INCH TOTAL HITS HITS> 1 INCH TOTAL HITS 
STS-6 15 80	 - 36 120 
STS-8 3 29 7 56 
STS-9 (41-A) 9 49 14 58 
STS- 11(41-B) 11 19 34 63 
STS-13 (41-C) 5 27 8 36 
STS- 14(41-D) 10 44 30 111 
STS- 17(41-0) 25 69 36 154 
STS-19 (51-A) 14 66 20 87 
STS-20 (51-C) 24 67 28 81 
STS .27 (51-I) 21 96 33 141 
STS-28 (51-J) 7 66 17 111 
STS-30 (61-A) 24 129 34 183 
STS-31 (61-B) 37 177 55 257 
STS-32 (61-C) 20 134 39 193 
STS-29 18 100 23 132 
STS-28R 13 60 20 76 
STS-34 17 51 18 53 
STS-33R 21 107 21 118 
STS-32R 13 111 15 120 
STS-36 17 61 19 81 
STS-31R 13 47 14 63 
STS-41 13 64 16 76 
STS-38 7 70 8 81 
STS-35 15 132 17 147 
STS-37 7 91 10 113 
STS-39 14 217 16 238 
STS-40 23 153 25 197 
STS-43 24 122 25 131 
STS-48 14 100 25 182 
STS-44 6 74 9 101 
STS-45 18 122, 22 172 
STS-49 6 55 11 114 
STS-50 28 141 45 184 
STS-46 11 186 22 236 
STS-47 3 48 11 108 
STS-52 6 152 16 290 
STS-53 11 145 23 240 
STS-54 14 80 14 131 
AVERAGE 14.7 93.2 220 132.5 
SIGMA 7.5 46.6 10.8 62.5
MISSIONS STS-23,24,25,26,26R, 27R, 30R, AND 42 ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS ANALYSIS 
SINCE THESE MISSIONS HAD SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN DEBRIS SOURCES 
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Overall view of Orbiter nose. Note moderate hazing of forward 
'	 facing windows and small damage sites on window perimeter 
tiles. Part of a AFRSI panel is loose aft of EROS thruster Flu. 
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The Orbiter lower surface tiles sustained a total of 94 hits,
of which 18 had a major dimension of 1-inch or greater. 
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The largest tile damage site measured 9" x 
located on the lower surface of the RH 
extension. The shallow depth is indicative 
density material.
• 2" x 0.2" and was 
wing leading edge 
of an impact by low
PAGE 
COLu r HOTOGRAPH
PA p!.;-.- r"ff" 
$;:f 
•	 I 
Alt-
40
41	 V J1 !k\t i	 '4' j '•i  
-'La1l view of the LH2 ET/ORB uiiiLilical. All sepaflon 
ordnance devices functioned properly. No flight hardware was 
found on the runway below the umbilical when the ET door was 
opened.
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Overall view of the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. All separation 
ordnance devices functioned properly. No flight hardware was 
found on the runway below the umbilical when the ET door was 
opened.
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Tiles on the LH OMS pod leading edge sustained more damage than 
usual (35 hits, of which 15 had a major dimension of 1-inch or 
greater). Several of the damage sites reached a depth of 1.25 
'
	
	
inches. The cause of this damage is believed to be ice from the 
waste water dump nozzle near the crew hatch. 
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Eight tile fragments found on the runway originated from the 
vertical stabilizer "stinger" and had been dislodged by contact 
with the drag chute riser lines during deployment. 
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9.0 DEBRIS SAMPLE LAB REPORTS 
A total of nine samples were obtained from OV-103 Discovery 
during the STS-56 post landing debris assessment at Kennedy 
Space Center (reference Figure 18). The nine submitted samples 
consisted of 8 window wipes (Windows 1-8) and 1 tile damage 
site sample with embedded particulate. The samples were 
analyzed by the NASA KSC Microchemical Analysis Branch (MAB) 
for material composition and comparison to known STS materials. 
Debris analysis involves the placing and correlating of 
particles and residues with respect to composition, thermal 
(mission) effects, and availability. Debris sample results are 
shown in tabular form (Figure 23) and analyses are discussed by 
Orbiter location in the following summaries. 
Orbiter Windows 
Samples from the Orbiter windows indicated exposure to SRB BSM 
exhaust; Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS); paints and 
primer from various sources; landing site products; and organic 
materials. A finding that had been previously observed (STS-50 
vertical stabilizer sample) was the presence of "E-glass." 
Carbon steel spheres, found in the STS-54 window samples, were 
also detected in this sampling set. Preliminary results of the 
organic material analysis indicate similar types of compounds 
as those previously noted. There was no apparent damage related 
to these residual findings. 
Lower Surface Tile 
The sample from the Orbiter lower surface tile damage site 
revealed exposure to Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS) 
materials only. The absence of material other than TPS 
particles found in this sample seems to be consistent with the 
findings of previous samples taken from the Orbiter lower 
surface. The damage site exhibited some exposure to elevated 
temperature in the form of tile 'glazing' and the presence of 
heated TPS materials. 
STS-54 Organic Analysis 
Added to this report are the final results of the STS-54 
organic analysis, including a new type of material found in the 
window samples. This material appears as a adhesive/ sealant 
similar to a Locktite. The new finding does not appear to be 
related to a debris problem in that no damage was associated 
with this residue. 
The variety of residuals attributed to known sources did not 
seem to change significantly when compared to previous sample 
data (reference Figure 23).
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New Findings 
This sampling set provided new findings in debris residual 
post-flight samples. All of the new findings, which were 
obtained from the window samples, do not appear related to a 
debris damage problem. A yellow calcium or silica-rich 
material with a 'fused' appearance was noted. Polyvinylchloride 
(PVC) material with a calcium carbonate filler was also noted. 
A new form of Orbiter TPS, a gray insulation filler, was 
observed in the residual analysis. The filler is believed to 
have originated as a tile repair material. All of the findings 
are under evaluation and comparative testing to isolate exact 
sources.
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10.0 POST LAUNCH ANOMALIES 
Based on the debris inspections and film/video review, eight 
Post Launch Anomalies, including two IFA candidates, were 
observed on the STS-56 mission. 
10.1 LAUNCH PAD/ SHUTTLE LANDING FACILITY 
1. A small hydrogen leak and associated ice buildup 
(10 1l x4"x3/8") was detected at the GH2 vent line elbow/flex line 
flange during stable replenish. Post launch disassembly of the 
flange revealed the old Fluorogreen gasket, which was cracked, 
had not been removed prior to installation of the new 
Fluorogold gasket. In addition, the flange bolts had not been 
re-torqued after the last cryogenic loading cycle. 
10.2 EXTERNAL TANK 
1. As many as 12 divots were present in the LH2 tank-to-
intertank flange closeout on the ET -z side. Some of the divots 
were 10-12 inches in diameter. 
2. As many as 11 divots were present in the intertank acreage 
on the -Z side of the ET. Numerous divots appeared in a line 
and may be indicative of a spray or processing problem. 
Although appearing shallow in depth, several of the divots were 
estimated to be 24 inches in diameter. An IFA was taken against 
the new block of intertanks, which have shown an increasing 
trend in the appearance of acreage divots. 
10.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
1. Holddowri Post #5 Anomaly: A plunger, spring, and associated 
hardware from the Debris Containment System (DCS) was found on 
holddown post #5 still attached to the stud. This hardware is 
normally contained in the DCS housing and remains with the SRB 
aft skirt during flight. (IFA candidate) 
2. Diagonal-cutting pliers were found wedged between the HDP 
#4 DCS housing and the RB aft skirt forged foot web. (IFA 
candidate) 
3. The RH frustum was missing no TPS but had 11 MSA-2 debonds 
over fasteners. The LH frustum had 20 MSA-2 debonds. 
Significant blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred in an area 
between the -Y and +Y axes from the BSM's to the 395 ring 
frame.
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10.4 ORBITER 
1. A thin, rectangular, dark object (possibly a tile gap filler 
or GSE tile shim/spacer) originated from the LH aft RCS stinger 
tiles (edge of the aft surface) during SSME ignition. 
2. The tiles on the LH OHS pod leading edge sustained more 
damage than usual (at least 35 hits, of which 15 had a major 
dimension of 1 inch or greater). Several of the tile damage 
sites reached a depth ranging from 0.5 to approximately 1.25 
inches. The cause of this damage is still undetermined. STS-53 
was the last mission to sustain greater than average tile 
damage on the LH OMS pod leading edge (27 hits total; 10 hits 
1-inch or greater).
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Appendix A. JSC Photographic Analysis Summary 
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May 20, 1993 
Greg Katnik 
MCITV-MSD-22 
OSB Room 5203R 
KSC, Florida 32899 
Dear Greg, 
The following Summary of Significant Events report is from the Johnson Space Center NSTS 
Photographic and Television Analysis Project, STS-56 Final Report, and was completed May 
18, 1993. Publication numbers are LESC-30778 and JSC-25994-56. The actual document 
can be obtained through the LESC library/333-6594 or Christine Dailey /483-5336 of the 
NSTS Photographic and Television Analysis Project.
4L 7/ao/& 
Christine Dailey, Project Sf,ecialist 
Photo/TV Analysis Project 
104
	2.0	 Summary of Si ficant Events Analysis 
This section summarizes significant screening and image analysis activities for mission 
STS-56. Details of the screening and analysis can be seen in Appendices B and D. Most 
of the events described under Section 2.0 have been seen on previous missions. Unless 
stated otherwise, no follow-up actions have been requested. 
The nighttime lighting conditions hindered the analysis of many of the launch views. 
The debris containment system (DCS) on the LSRB hoiddown post M-5 was reported to 
have failed. The spring and plunger escaped the DCS and was impaled on the spherical 
bearing on the MLP. No photographic coverage of the LSRB hoiddown post M-5 
anomaly was obtained (Camera E-12 did not run). No unidentified debris objects in the 
vicinity of the LSRB aft skirt were observed. 
KSC reported a hydrogen leak and ice formation near the GH2 vent line elbow/flex line 
flange. Nothing unusual in this area was observed on the films. 
	
2.1	 Debris 
The only debris observed to strike the vehicle (near the sill of the Orbiter umbilical well) 
was ice/frost from the ET/Orbiter LH2 umbilical during SSME startup. It is also possible 
that ice/frost debris from the forward end of the shuttle launch vehicle (SLV) struck the 
Orbiter fuselage tiles at liftoff. No damage to the SLV was observed on any of the launch 
and landing films and videos. The multiple pieces of debris seen falling aft of the SLY at 
liftoff, throughout the roll maneuver, and beyond on the launch tracking views was typical 
to previous missions. Most of the debris sightings were probably reaction control system 
(RCS) paper, ice/frost from the Orbiter umbilicals or chunks of propellant from the solid 
rocket boosters. Some of the debris may have been from the intertank TPS of the external 
tank. Unless stated otherwise, no follow up action has been requested. 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
2. 1 . 1	 Debris near the Time of SSME Ignition 
2.1.1.1 	 Debris Strike to Tiles near Umbilical Well Sill (Cameras OTV-109, OTV-163, E-6, E-31) 
At least one piece of white debris, appeared to strike the underside of the Orbiter near the 
LI-12 umbilical well during SSME startup (05:28:57.575 UTC). The white debris 
appeared to be frost/ice from the ET/Orbiter LH2 umbilical. No damage to the vehicle 
was observed. 
Figure 2.1.1.1	 Debris Strike to the Lower Side of the Orbiter 
The arrow points to a white piece of debris as it struck below the LH2 umbilical well sill 
during SSME ignition. 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
2.1.1.2	 LH2 and L02 Umbilical Disconnect Debris 
(Cameras OTV-109, OTV-149, OTV-150, OTV-151, OTV-154, 
OTV-163, OTV-170, OTV-171, E-2, E-3, E-5, E-6, E-17, E-18, 
E-19, E-20, E-31, E-34, E40, E-52, E-62, E-76, E-77) 
The usual amount of ice debris from the L02 and LH2 TSM T-O umbilicals as well as the 
ET/Orbiter umbilicals were noted on many of the MLP camera films and videos. Multiple 
pieces of ice and/or liquid were seen falling from the flange of the LH2 17 inch ET/Orbiter 
umbilical line. A single dark piece of debris was seen near the LH2 T-O TSM umbilical at 
SSMIE startup. 
Figure 2.1.1.2	 Dark Debris from LH2 TSM Umbilical 
A single dark piece of debris (arrow), possibly a piece of tape, originated from the LI-12 
T-O TSM umbilical and fell aft at SSME startup (05:28:56.938 UTC). 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
2. 1. 1 .3	 Debris from Left Aft RCS Stinger Area 
(Camera E-20) 
A thin, rectangular object, dark on one side and light on the other, originated from the left 
aft RCS stinger area and fell aft during SSME ignition. 
Figure 2.1.1.3	 Debris from Left Aft RCS Stinger Area 
KSC stated that the debris from the left aft RCS stinger area (arrow) was possibly a tile 
gap filler or tile shim. 
2.1.1.4	 Dark Debris Below SSME #1 
(Camera E-3) 
A single small dark piece of debris was seen falling aft of SSME #1 at SSME startup (T-3.548 
seconds). The origin of the debris could not be determined. 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
2.1.2	 Debris near the Time of SRB Ignition 
2.1.2.1	 Debris North of MLP after Liftoff (Task #13) 
(Cameras K7V-7B, KTV-21B, E-62, E-222, E-224) 
Figure 2.1.2.1	 Debris North of MLP after Liftoff 
Multiple pieces (at least five) of debris were seen above the SRB exhaust plume from 
approximately 0.9 seconds MET until 2.3 seconds MET. The objects were not seen to 
strike the vehicle. The debris appeared to be well north and east of the MILP and initially 
moved up and then down as the vehicle lifted off. 
An attempt was made to use a Cartesian phototheodolite program to estimate the 3D 
position of the debris. The phototheodolite method was unsuccessful in producing 
acceptable results because there was no way to tell if the same debris was being seen by 
each camera and the location of the camera positions in Orbiter coordinates was not very 
accurate. 
Instead of using a phototheodolite method to obtain the 3D positions of the debris, a single 
camera solution using KTV-7B and E-62 separately was used. KTV-7B is located almost 
due east of the pad. The distance north of the MLP and the height of the debris can be 
estimated well from this view. Using the ET diameter for scale and assuming that the 
debris is at the same distance as the ET, the distance of three pieces of debris from the 
MLP were 185 ft., 176 ft., and 201 ft. while their heights were 103 ft., 94 ft., and 93 ft. 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
respectively. Since the debris was closer to the camera than the ET (this was confirmed 
from the KTV-21B and the E-222 views that showed the debris to the east of the MLP) 
the distance estimates are maximum distances. 
Using the approximated distances of the debris from the MLP calculated from camera 
KTV-7B, the size and velocity of the debris was estimated using data from camera E-62. 
Camera E-62, located on the perimeter southeast of the MLP, showed that the debris 
initially moved up and then fell back as the vehicle lifted off. The size and velocity of the 
debris that appeared to attain the highest altitude was measured. The size and velocity 
represent a maximum since the KTV-713 estimates of debris distance from the MLP were 
simply added to the distance of the camera from the MLP. The maximum diameter of the 
debris was found to be approximately 10.6 inches and the maximum velocity was found 
to be approximately 28.5 feet per second. 
From this analysis it was not possible to tell if the debris was associated with the vehicle 
(e.g.. SRB flame duct debris) or unassociated objects such as birds. 
2.1.2.2	 SRB Flame Duct Debris (Task #7) (Cameras E-7, E-8, E-9, E-11, E-13, E-14, E-16, E-62, E-224) 
No debris from the SRB flame duct was identified that would require a follow-up velocity 
determination. The debris seen north of the MLP on cameras E-62, E-222, KTV-713 and 
KTV-21B could possibly have been associated with the flame duct but this could not be 
confirmed. See section 2.1.2.1 and in Appendix D, Task #13 for more information on 
this debris. 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
2.1.2.3	 Debris from L02 TSM Carrier Plate (Camera E-19) 
Figure 2.1.2.3	 Debris from L02 TSM Carrier Plate 
A single light colored piece of debris appeared to originate between the L02 TSM carrier 
plate and the Orbiter and fall aft at liftoff (0.335 seconds MET). 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
2.1.2.4	 Debris in Front of RSRB (Camera E-9) 
Figure 2.1.2.4	 Debris in Front of RSRB 
A thin flat rectangular piece of debris (light on one side and dark on the other) fell through 
the field of view from left to right in front of the right SRB at liftoff (0.562 seconds 
MET). The object did not appear to strike the vehicle. 
2.1.2.5	 Dark Debris in Front of Left Wing (Camera E41) 
A single piece of dark debris was seen to travel in front of the left wing of the Orbiter at 
liftoff. The origin of the debris was not determined. The debris did not appear to strike 
the vehicle. 
2.1.3	 Debris after Liftoff 
Multiple pieces of debris were seen falling aft of the SLY from liftoff through ascent on the 
launch tracking views. Debris falling aft of the SLV after liftoff has been seen on films and 
videos from all previous missions. Most of this type of debris has been attributed to ice from 
the ET/Orbiter umbilicals or RCS paper. Some of the debris may have been from the intertank 
TPS of the external tank. This assumption is based on the appearance of the external tank as 
recorded on the handheld photography taken by the astronauts after main engine cut off 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
(MECO). See section 2.3.6 DTO-3 12 Onboard Handheld Camera ET Analysis. None of the 
debris seen after liftoff appeared to strike the vehicle. 
2.1.3.1	 Debris Near ET Forward Bipod 
(Cameras OTV-161, E-34) 
56 Camera 0VI6l 
Debr s between F and Orb ter 
Figure 2.1.3.1	 Debris Between Orbiter and ET 
Several small pieces of white debris were seen falling aft of the ET forward bipod between 
the Orbiter and the ET at liftoff (3.38 seconds MET). Some of the debris may have struck 
the vehicle, but no damage was observed. 
2.1.3.2	 Baggie Material Debris 
(Camera E-220) 
Orange colored debris, probably umbilical purge barrier (baggie) material, was seen falling aft 
of the ET/Orbiter umbilicals at 22.85 seconds MET. 
2.1.3.3	 Debris Near the Orbiter 
(Cameras ET-207, ET-208, E-54, E-57, E-62, E-207, 
E-212, E- 213, E-220, E-223, E-224) 
The following are examples of some of the debris items seen after liftoff that were first 
seen near the Orbiter. Most of this type of debris can be attributed to RCS paper and ice 
from the ET/Orbiter umbilicals: At 3.94 seconds MET, a small light colored piece of 
debris (origin undetermined) fell aft of the left outboard elevon at tower clear (E-223). At 
5.03 seconds MET, a single light colored piece of debris first seen at the base of the 
vertical stabilizers fell aft into the SSME exhaust plume (E-224). A light colored piece of 
debris was seen falling aft along the Orbiter right wing at 17.846 seconds MET (E-54). 
The debris was first seen coming from behind the right OMS pod. At 33.06 seconds 
MET, a second light colored piece of debris fell along the Orbiter left wing and aft into the 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
SLV exhaust plume. At 36.58 seconds MET, light colored debris was seen falling aft 
from near the vertical stabilizer (E-212, E-223). At 38.06 seconds MET, multiple pieces 
of orange colored debris were seen near the Orbiter vertical stabilizer falling aft toward the 
SLY exhaust plume (E-207). At 39.17 seconds MET apparent forward RCS paper debris 
was noted on film E-220. A light colored piece of debris first seen near the left OMS pod 
fell aft of the base of the vertical stabilizer at 55.82 seconds MET. This piece of debris 
appeared larger than the typical RCS paper debris (Camera E-220). 
2.1.3.4	 Debris Causing Orange Streak in SSME Plume 
(Cameras E-205, E-223) 
Figure 2.1.3.4	 Debris Causing Orange Streak in SSNIE Plume 
A single light colored piece of debris fell aft into the SSME plume and caused a bright 
orange streak at approximately 45.1 seconds MET. The streak was seen for 8 frames or 
0.083 seconds. 
2.1.3.5	 Debris Near SRB Exhaust Plume During Ascent 
(Cameras ET-204, ET-207, ET-208, ET-212, KTV-13, E-57, 
E-59, E-205, E-207, E-208, E-212, E-218, E-220, E-223, E-224) 
A large amount of debris was seen coming from above and below the SRB exhaust plume 
between the roll maneuver and SRB separation. Some of the debris was seen to come in 
large clusters. None of the debris was seen to strike the launch vehicle. 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
2.2	 MLP Events 
2.2.1	 Discoloration of the 1121) RCS Cover 
(Cameras OTV-170, OTV-1 71 , E-2, E-19) 
Figure 2.2.1	 Discoloration of the R2D RCS Cover 
A discoloration of the R2D RCS cover on the right RCS stinger was noted before SSME 
startup. 
STS-56 Final Report	
115	
ORIGINAL PAGE 
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
2.2.2	 Orange Vapor (Possibly Free-Burning Hydrogen) 
(Cameras OTV-163, OTV-170, OTV-171, E4. E-16, E-30, E-36)) 
Orange vapor, possibly free burning hydrogen, was noted beneath the body flap and above 
the rims of SSME #1, SSME #2, and SSME #3 at SSME startup (T - 4.94 seconds on the 
camera E-4 view). Since free burning hydrogen is essentially colorless, engineers who 
reviewed films after the STS-38 mission believed that the orange cloud occurred due to 
impurities in the vapor. Similar events have been seen on past missions. 
hAl 
Figure 2.2.2	 Orange Vapor (Possibly Free-Burning Hydrogen) Noted 
under the Body Flap 
Orange vapor is visible beneath the body flap in the camera OTV-163 at SSME ignition. 
2.2.3	 Vapor near Right OMS Nozzle
(Camera E-2) 
A white vapor was noted between the right OMS nozzle and the right RCS stinger at SSME 
startup (T- 1.7 seconds). 
2.2.4	 Vapor near Aft ET/SRB Attach Point 
(Camera E-2) 
A white vapor was noted near the aft ET/SRB attach point at liftoff. 
2.2.5	 Possible TPS Erosion 
(Cameras E-18, E-20) 
Possible TPS erosion was noted on the left inboard elevon and at the base of the left RCS 
stinger prior to liftoff. Slight TPS erosion was also seen on the base of the left OMS pod 
and between the SSME's. Minor TPS erosion has been seen on nearly all previous 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
missions. This occurrence is believed to result from the vibrations caused by SSME 
ignition. 
2.2.6 Orange Flashes and Flares in SSME Exhaust Plume 
(Cameras OTV-170, E-5, E-50, E-54, E-207, E-212, E-213, 
E-218, E-223) 
Several orange flashes were noted in the SSME #3 plume at liftoff 
(05:29:00.612 UTC). 
Multiple orange flares were noted in the SSME exhaust plumes between 13 and 47 
seconds MET. Several of the flares were identified to be in the SSME #1 exhaust plume. 
Flares during this time period have been seen on several earlier missions. Flares on earlier 
missions have been attributed to RCS paper burning up in the SSME plume. 
	
2.2.7	 Discoloration of RSRB Hoiddown Post M-4 Foot 
(Camera E-7) 
A discoloration was noted on the outboard edge of the RSRB foot of hoiddown post M-4 
at liftoff. 
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2.3 	 Ascent Events 
2.3.1	 Loose Thermal Curtain Tape on RSRB Aft Skirt 
(Cameras E-25, E-57, E-220, E-222, E-223) 
Figure 2.3.1	 Loose Tape on RSRB Thermal Curtain 
A loose thermal curtain tape was noted on the alt skirt of the RSRB during liftoff prior to 
the roll maneuver. This event has now been seen on five missions since reflight. 
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2.3.2	 Light Colored Vapor above SSME #1 
(Cameras E-207, E-212) 
Figure 2.3.2	 Light Colored Vapor above SSME # 1 after Liftoff 
A light colored vapor was noted above SSME #1 and traveled into the SSME plume after 
the roll maneuver at 58.84 seconds MET. The vapor was in view for four frames or 
0.062 seconds. 
2.3.3	 Body Flap Motion (Task #4) 
2.3.3.1	 Body Flap Motion seen at SSME Ignition 
(Cameras E-17, E-18) 
As part of an ongoing study, flap deflection was measured just aft after SSME ignition on 
Cameras E-17 and E-18. Results from STS-56 as well as other OV-102 and OV-103 
missions have been summarized in the LESC document "Photographic Analysis of the 
Space Shuttle Body Flap Motion seen at SSME Ignition" (LESC-30803). 
The STS-56 data indicated a maximum deflection of 0.6 inches on the starboard side and 
0.7 inches on the port side. A power spectrum analysis was performed over the full 310 
frame sequence (-0.775 seconds). The analysis indicated the presence of global rotation, 
torsion and the second bending modes on the port side; and all of these plus local rotation 
and the first bending moment on the starboard side.
CC;:,L
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2.3.3.2	 Body FIapMotion seen during Ascent (Cameras E-207, E-212, E-223) 
Films from Camera E-207, E-212 and E-223 were re-screened for a subjective 
measure of the amount of body flap motion visible. A preliminary analysis 
indicated the presence of significant body flap motion seen on Camera E-207. 
Three points were digitized on each frame between 2830 and 2930 (from 47.894 
seconds MET through 49.484 seconds MET). These points consisted of the 
starboard and port trailing edges of the flap and a control point located at the top aft 
corner of the speed brake. Measurements were made by three different analysts as 
a statistical check. The maximum deflection of the starboard corner of the trailing 
edge of the flap was found to be 5.58 inches (+1-2.84 inches). The maximum 
deflection on the port trailing edge was measured at 5.83 inches (42.74 inches). 
A power spectrum analysis was performed on the sequence of frames (2860-2900) 
where the maximum deflection was observed. This analysis indicated the presence 
of a strong global rotation component. Graphs and calculations are shown in 
Appendix D. 
2.3.4	 Elevon Position after Liftoff (Task #11) (Camera E-212) 
The mission, evaluation room (MER) manager reported that during ascent at approximately 
65 seconds mission elapsed time (MET), small left and right outboard elevon deflections 
along with outboard elevon primary differential oscillations were observed. No elevon 
load relief had been commanded. 
The difference between the STS-56 Orbiter left wing inboard and outboard elevon 
positions was investigated using film from the long range tracking cameras. The position 
of the left inboard and outboard elevons seen on STS-56 was also compared to the elevon 
positions seen on other selected missions. Film from camera E-212 from STS-39 and 
STS-48 were reviewed to compare the relative positions of the left wing elevons. These 
missions were chosen because they were both night launches and were at 57 degree 
inclinations. 
STS-39 launched at nearly dawn. Therefore, the lighting permitted good visibility of the 
SLV on the camera E-212 film. There was an obvious difference in the left wing inboard 
and outboard elevon positions on the STS-39 film. The elevon positions on STS-39 were 
almost exactly the same as that seen on STS-56. 
The E-212 film from STS-48 was dark and slightly out of focus. Aside from this, the 
inboard and outboard left elevon positions on STS-48 appeared similar to that of STS- 56. 
The visual analysis findings on the elevon positions were reported to the mission 
evaluation room manager prior to landing. 
2.3.5	 Recirculation (Task #1) 
(Camera E-205) 
The recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLY prior to SRB 
separation has been seen on nearly all previous missions. For STS-56, the start of 
recirculation was observed at about 93 seconds MET and the end was noted at approximately 
111 seconds MET on Camera E-205. Due to the night time lighting conditions and the 
launch inclination angle, this was the only camera that provided a good view of recirculation. 
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See Appendix D, Task #1 for a summary of recirculation start and stop times for all missions 
since reflight. 
2.3.6	 DTO-312 Onboard Handheld Camera ET Analysis 
(Task #6) 
(Magazines 02 and 03)) 
STS-56 crew performed DTO-0312 acquiring 72 views of the external tank (ET) from two 
rolls of 35 mm film. Apparent damage to the external tank thermal protection system 
(TPS) on the intertank acreage was observed. The markings or divots seen on the 
photography resulted in the declaration of a inflight anomaly (IFA number 
STS-56-T-001). 
The photographs were taken by Astronaut Ellen Ochoa using Nikon F4 camera with a 300 
mm lens (Method 3). The analysis results were reported to the Mission Evaluation Room 
(MER) Manager and to the standard distribution. 
The entire ET was photographed except the side toward the Orbiter (as the vehicle sits on 
the pad, or the +Z axis). The pictures were acquired several minutes later than usual 
because the night launch increased the time before the tank entered daylight. 
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Figure 2.3.6
	 Divots on ET 
Six or more light colored marks or divots were visible on the intertank TPS on the -z or 
far side of the ET. These marks ranged between 18 and 26 inches (Figure 2.3.6 arrows 1 
and 2). This view was taken while the ET was 2.30 km from the Orbiter at approximately 
eleven minutes after ET separation. The light colored mark visible on the ET LM tank/aft 
dome interface is the RSRB/ET aft attach. The TPS on the ET nose and aft dome 
appeared charred as usual. The booster separation motor (BSM) burn scars on the L02 
tank appeared typical to previous missions. 
Approximately five marks or divots are visible on the 1,112flntertank closeout flange on the 
-Y axis of the ET in the above view. The divots in this area ranged between 16 and 24 
inches (Figure 2.3.6 arrows 3 and 4). Bright marks are visible on the aft ET/Orbiter 
attach bracing. These bright marks have been determined to be reflections of sunlight off 
normal protuberances on the attach bracing. 
No tumble analysis was performed since the ET was not observed to rotate at least 90 
degrees. Detailed notes for all the photographic screening are located in Appendix D Task 
#6. 
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2.4
	
On Orbit 
2.4.1
	
Debris Seen During Spartan Capture (Task #12) 
Figure 2.4.1
	
Debris Seen During Spartan Capture 
The white debris object annotated above was seen on video during the Spartan capture. 
Measurements of the size and velocity of this object were made and provided to the 
mission evaluation manager. The diameter of the RMS end effector was used for scale in 
order to determine the size of the object. The diameter of the RMS is 13.6 inches without 
the thermal blanket material. The object was seen to pass in front of the RMS arm. 
Therefore a maximum size estimate of the object was made assuming the debris to be at 
the same distance as the arm. The dimension of the object was determined to be 
approximately 2 x 3 inches. The diameter of the RMS in the image was probably slightly 
greater than 13.6 inches because the thermal blanket material was attached. This would 
make the maximum size of the debris object slightly larger. 
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The debris distance in inches was plotted versus time and a regression line was fit to the 
data. The slope of the regression line was used as the velocity. The velocity of the debris 
object was found to be approximately 1. 15 feet per second. This velocity represents a 
maximum velocity since the scale was determined using an object that is further from the 
camera than the debris. 
2.5	 Landing Events 
2.5.1	 Landing Sink Rate Analysis (Task #3) 
2.5.1.1	 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Film(Cameras EL-9, EL-12) 
Camera EL-9 was used to determine the film sink rate of the main gear. The analysis 
showed that the main gear sink rate was 3.96 feet per second. Data was gathered 
approximately 1 second prior to landing through touchdown or approximately 100 frames. 
The points digitized were right main gear, left main gear and top of the runway below both 
main gear. For main gear sink rate, the scale was found using the distance between the 
main landing gear struts. An assumption was made that the plane of the camera was 
parallel with the Orbiter's y-z plane. The y distance between the average position of the 
main gear and the runway was then multiplied by the scale to find the height of the main 
gear above the runway. The height of the vehicle above the runway was plotted with 
respect to time. A linear least squares line was fitted to the points. The slope of the line 
equals to the main gear sink rate. 
Nose gear touchdown occurred approximately 15 seconds after main gear touchdown. 
This rate was determined to be 3.28 feet per second. Camera EL- 12 was used to 
determine the sink rate of the nose gear. Scalar information was determined by a system 
of equations which took into account the orientation of the camera relative to the Orbiter. 
Data was gathered approximately 2 seconds prior to landing through touchdown at a rate 
of 51 frames per second which is the temporal resolution of the film. The equations were 
solved for each observation which took into account the change in perspective as well as 
increase in size. The distance between the bottom of the nose gear and the runway was 
computed and a linear least squares line was fit to the data. The slope of the vertical 
distance versus time data is the actual sink rate. 
Graphs depicting the above data can be seen in Appendix D, Task #3 
2.5.1.2	 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Video 
•	 (Cameras SLF -South LSOC, K7V-33L) 
Sink rate was calculated for the main gear of the vehicle using a single camera solution. The 
analysis showed that the main gear sink rate was 3.83 feet per second. SLF-South LSOC was 
used to determine the video sink rate of the main gear. Data was gathered approximately 1 
second prior to landing through touchdown at a rate of 30 frames per second. The points 
digitized were right main gear, left main gear and top of the runway. For main gear sink rate, 
the scale was found using the distance between the main landing gear struts. An assumption 
was made that the plane of the camera was parallel with the Orbiter's y-z plane. The y 
distance between the average position of the main gear and the runway was then multiplied by 
the scale to find the height of the main gear above the runway. These heights were then 
regressed with respect to time. The slope of the regression line was equal to the main gear 
sink rate. 
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Nose gear touchdown occurred approximately 15 seconds after main gear touchdown. 
Camera TV-33 was used to determine the sink rate of the nose gear. Scalar information was 
determined by a system of equations which took into account the orientation of the camera 
relative to the Orbiter. Data was gathered approximately 1 second prior to landing through 
touchdown at a rate of 30 frames per second, the temporal resolution of the video. The 
equations were solved for each observation which took into account the change in perspective 
as well as increase in size. The distance between the bottom of the nose gear and the runway 
was computed and a linear regression was applied on this normalized vertical distance versus 
time data to find the actual sink rate. This rate was determined to be 3.44 feet per second. 
See Appendix D, Task #3 for details. 
2.5.2	 Debris from Nose Wheel Area 
(Cameras SLF East, SLF West, and SLF Infrared) 
Several pieces of debris appeared to fall from the nose wheel area at nose gear door 
opening on the above infrared views. Additional debris may have fallen from the main 
gear area. The debris traveled along the underside of the Orbiter and toward the left wing. 
KSC reported that the warm objects falling away from the nose landing gear area were gap 
fillers. The gap fillers were inserted into open spaces after the closure of the landing gear 
door(s) to prevent heat intrusion during reentry. 
Figure 2.5.2	 Debris from Nose Wheel Door Area Before Landing 
The red dots on the views above trace the path of the debris seen at the time the landing gear 
doors were opened. The view on the left is negative infrared taken from the west side of 
runway 33. The view from the right is a positive infrared taken from the east side of runway 
33. 
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2.5.3	 Drag Chute Performance (Task #9) (Cameras EL-7, EL-7A, EL-JO, EL-9, EL-9A, EL-12, 
EL-15) 
The landing of Discovery at the end of mission STS-56 marked the seventh deployment of 
the Orbiter drag chute. All components of the drag chute appeared to deploy as expected. 
A 'quick-look' analysis of the drag chute heading angles was performed using video from 
video camera SLF SOUTH TBC. Standard analysis of the drag chute angles as a 
function of time was performed using the views from the film cameras EL-9 and EL-7. 
This analysis is used to support the improvement of the aerodynamic math models 
currently in use. An extra task on this mission was to perform comparative drag chute 
diameter measurements between this mission and previous missions. The drag chute 
diameter was measured to be approximately 25.6 feet on this mission. The diameter was 
measured on several previous missions and found to be approximately 28.2 feet. The 
smaller diameter was an intentional technique intended to aid in stabilizing the dynamic 
behavior of the drag chute. The chute behavior did appear to be significantly more stable 
than on previous missions. The maximum chute deflection was approximately 4.2 
degrees and the average peak to peak deflection was approximately 3 degrees, 
significantly less than on previous missions. 
Graphical and tabular representations of the results of this analysis may be found in 
Appendix D, Task #9. 
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2.5.4	 Post Landing Video Inspection 
Figure 2.5.4	 Tile Damage to Vertical Stabilizer Stinger 
Several tiles were seen to be damaged on the right aft edge of the vertical stabilizer stinger 
during the screening of the post landing video inspection views. 
Other items noted during the screening of the post-landing inspection video views were: 
Fabric on the leading edge of the nose wheel doors appeared to be torn or missing. 
Portions of the fabric in the nose wheel well appeared discolored. 
Missing tile surface material on the upper edge of the right nose gear door was visible. 
Pieces of umbilical purge barrier (baggie material) and loose stripping were visible in the 
close-up views of the umbilicals. 
2.6	 Other Normal Events 
Other normal events observed included: frost buildup on SSME vent nozzles, elevon 
motion noted at SSME startup and liftoff, frost on ET GOX vent louvers, ice /frost falling 
from GUCP during disconnect, ET twang, ropes on MLP at liftoff, vapor from the rudder 
speed brake drain vent, RCS paper debris at SSME startup and after liftoff, vapor from 
the ET aft dome and SRB stiffener rings after liftoff, flashes in the SSME plume during 
startup, minor pad debris in SLV exhaust plume after liftoff, charring of the ET aft dome 
and ET aft dome outgassing after liftoff, white flashes in the SSME exhaust plume after 
the roll maneuver, expansion waves, linear optical distortions, and plume brightening. 
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I.	 INTRODUCTION 
Space Shuttle Mission STS-56, the sixteenth flight of the 
Orbiter Discovery was conducted April 8, 1993 at approximately 
12:32 A.M. Central Daylight Time from Launch Complex 39B (LC-
39B), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. Extensive 
photographic and video coverage was provided and has been 
evaluated to determine proper operation of the ground and flight 
hardware. Cameras (video and cine) providing this coverage are 
located on the fixed service structure (FSS), mobile launch 
platform (MLP), LC-39B perimeter sites, onboard, and uprange and 
downrange tracking sites. 
II.	 ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES: 
The planned engineering photographic and video analysis 
objectives for STS-56 included, but were not limited to the 
following:
a. Overall facility and Shuttle vehicle coverage for 
anomaly detection 
b. Verification of cameras, lighting and timing systems C. Determination of SRB PlC firing time and SRB 
separation time 
d. Verification of Thermal Protection System (TPS) 
integrity 
e. Correct operation of the following: 
1. Holddown post blast covers 
2. SSME ignition 
3. LH2 and L02 17" disconnects 
4. GH2 umbilical 
5. TSM carrier plate umbilicals 
6. Free hydrogen ignitors 
7. Vehicle clearances 
8. GH2 vent line retraction and latch back 
9. Vehicle motion 
There was one special test objective for this mission: 
a. DTO-0312, ET photography after separation 
III. CAMERA COVERAGE ASSESSMENT: 
Film was received from forty-eight of fifty-one requested 
cameras as well as video from all twenty-four requested cameras. 
The following table illustrates the camera data received at MSFC 
for STS-56.
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CAMERA DATA RECEIVED FOR STS-56 
16mm	 35mm	 Video 
MLP	 19	 0	 4 
FSS	 7	 0	 3 
Perimeter	 3	 3	 6 
Tracking	 0	 15	 11 
Onboard	 0	 1	 0 
Totals	 29	 19	 24 
A detailed individual motion picture camera assessment is 
provided as Appendix B. Appendix C contains detailed assessments 
of the video products received at MSFC. 
a. Ground Camera Coverage: 
Photographic coverage of STS-56 was considered good. 
Coverage was degraded due to the low light levels at night. The 
northern tracking cameras acquited limited data due to the cloud 
coverage. The film from cameras E-12, E-15, and E-26 broke on 
start. These malfunctions may have been due to the extended 
nitrogen purge. This extended purge resulted from the earlier 
(48 hours) launch scrub. Camera E-64 experencied a mechancial 
failure (broken belt) resulting in no data. 
b. Onboard Camera Assessment: 
The astronauts carried two 35mm hand-held cameras to record 
film for evaluating the ET TPS integrity after ET separation. 
No on-board SRB cameras were flown due to the night time launch. 
IV. ANOMALIES/OBSERVATIONS: 
a. General Observations: 
While viewing the film, several events were noted which 
occur on most missions. These included: pad debris rising and 
falling as the vehicle lifts off; debris induced streaks in the 
SSME plume; ice falling from the 17" disconnects and umbilicals; 
and debris particles falling aft of the vehicle during ascent, 
which consist of RCS motor covers, hydrogen fire detectors and 
purge barrier material.
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A loose piece of thermal curtain tape was noted outboard the 
right SRB at liftoff. Body flap and inboard right elevon 
motions were noted during ascent. Several large pieces of debris were 
observed north of the MLP during SRM ignition. It is believed 
that this debris originated from the SRi'! flame duct. 
A light discoloration on the SRB hoiddown post M-4 was 
noted during liftoff. This discoloration is shown in figure 1. A 
black mark was observed on the right SRB forward skirt below 
the access door prior to liftoff. This type of mark was Previously 
observed on STS-54. 
b. SRM Slag: 
Copious amounts of slag were observed exiting the SRm 
plumes during ascent. These observations are not considered 
anomalous because of the increase in image contrast resulting 
from the night sky conditions. One large piece of "slag" 
entered the SSME plume creating a large orange flare. This event is 
shown in figure 2 from camera E-222 at T+43.7 seconds. 
Due to the SRI'! chamber pressure anomaly on STS-54, a study was conducted to determine if there is a correlation between 
amount of slag observed and chamber pressure increasesfrom nighttime launches and tests were chosen because
	
Film 
the contrast between the dark sky and the bright slag make particles more Visible
	
s these
. For the launches, cameras E-207 and E-208 were used for STS-33, 35, 36, 38, 48, 49, and 56. The 
two nighttime tests were TEM-9 and DM-9. The number of particles expelled from the plume and the time of occurrencs were 
noted. These data are presented in figures 3-16. Camera E-208 on STS-33 
provided no data due to poor image quality. Camera E-208 on STS-35 was not available. 
C. ET TPS Divots 
Seventy-two frames of the ET after separation were 
received and reviewed. At least fifteen divots were noted on the LH2 
intertank TPS acreage and on the LH2 intertank scarf joint on the 
-z side of the ET. Figure 17 is a frame of film taken from the 
35mm on-board camera showing these divots. 
V.	 ENGINEERING DATA RESULTS: 
a. T-Zero Times: 
T-Zero times are determined from cameras which view the SRB 
holddown posts numbers M-1, M-2, M-5 and M-6. These cameras 
record the explosive bolt combustion products. 
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POST	 CAMERA POSITION
M-1 E-9 
M-2 E-8 
M-5 E-12 
M-6 E-13
TIME (UTC) 
098:05:28:59.995 
no data 
no data 
098:05:28:59.996 
b. ET Tip Deflection: 
Maximum ET tip deflection for this mission was determined 
to be approximately 32.4 inches. Figure 18 is a data plot 
showing the measured motion of the ET tip in both the horizontal 
and vertical directions. These data were derived from camera 
OTV- 161.
c. SRB Separation Time: 
SRB separation time for STS-56 was determined to be 
098:05:31:05.89 UTC taken from camera E-208. 
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is in the clouds for 
the majority of ascent 
prior to SRB separation. 
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Vehicle was obscured 
by clouds after roll 
maneuver until T+40 
seconds.
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Space Systems Division 
Rockwell international Corporation
12214 Lakewood Boulevard 
Downey, California 90241-7009 
May 25, 1 993
Ro c kwe I 
]nternat1Ofli 
In Reply Refer to 93MA1 787 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
Houston, Texas 77058 
Attention: L. G. Williams (WA) 
Contract NAS9-1 8500, System Integration, Transmittal of the Rockwell 
Engineering Photographic Analysis Report for the STS-56 Mission. 
The System Integration Contractor hereby submits the Engineering 
Photographic Analysis Summary Report in accordance with the Space Shuttle 
Program Launch and Landing Photographic Engineering Evaluation Document 
(NSTS 08244). 
Extensive photographic and video coverage was provided and has been evaluated 
to determine ground and flight performance. Cameras (cine and video) 
providing this coverage are located on the Launch Complex 39B Fixed Service 
Structure (FSS), Mobile Launch Platform (MLP), various perimeter sites, and 
uprange and downrange tracking sites for the STS-56 launch conducted on 
April 8, 1993, at approximately 1:29 AM (EDT) from the Kennedy Space Center 
(KSC) and for the landing on April 17, 1993 at KSC (7:37 AM EDT). 
Rockwell received launch films from 80 cameras (56 cine, 24 video) and landing 
films from 27 cameras (15 cine, 12 video) to support the STS-56 photographic 
evaluation effort. Three films, E-12, E45 and E-26 were not available due to 
camera malfunction. 
All ground camera coverage for this mission including coverage on the MLP, 
FSS and tracking cameras were good considering that launch was at night. 
However, due to the poor lighting conditions at night, many of the launch films 
were hampered in some way. This hindered analysis and possible detection of 
debris and/or anomalies. 
Overall, the films showed STS-56 to be a clean flight. Several pieces of ice from 
the ET/ORB umbilicals were shaken loose at SSME ignition, but no damage to 
the Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS) was apparent. The usual - 
condensation and water vapors were seen at the ET aft dome and the SRB 
stiffener rings and dissipated after the completion of the roll maneuver. No 
vapor was observed in the vicinity of the rudder/speed brake at liftoff. Charring 
of the ET aft dome, recirculation and brightening of the SRB plumes were visible 
and normal. Booster Separation Motor (BSM) firing and SRB separation also 
appeared to be normal. 
(Packing Sheet No. DM93-12635) 
P.O. Box 7009
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Nominal performance was seen for the MLP and FSS hardware. FSS deluge 
water was activated prior to SSME ignition and the MLP rainbirds were 
activated at approximately 1 second Mission Elapsed Time (MET), as is normal. 
All blast deflection shields closed prior to direct SRB exhaust plume 
impingement. Both TSM umbilicals released and retracted as designed. The ET 
GH2 vent line carrier dropped normally and latched securely with no rebound. 
No anomalies were identified with the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical hydrogen 
dispersal system hardware. 
STS-56 was the fourteenth flight with the optimized attach link in the SRB 
hoiddown support post Debris Containment Systems (DCS's). The link is 
designed to increase the plunger velocity and seating accuracy, while leaving the 
holddown bolt ejection velocity unchanged. This prevents frangible nut 
fragments and/or NSI cartridges from falling from the DCS, while not 
increasing the probability of a holddown bolt hang-up. 
Significant events that were observed were the piece of debris falling aft into the 
SSME plume causing a bright orange flash and the spring and plunger from the 
DCS found during the Post Launch MLP debris inspection of holddown post #5. 
These events and other events noted by the Rockwell film/video users during the 
review and analysis of the STS-56 photographic items are summarized in the 
following comments. These events are not considered to be a constraint to next 
flight. 
ll*1 
On camera E-20, (frame 1380) and E223 (frame 4732) a piece of debris was 
seen falling aft into the SSME plume and caused a bright orange flash aft of 
the vehicle. This occurred at approximately 45 seconds MET. Follow-on 
analysis for this event continues at JSC. No further action is planned at 
RI/Dny. 
2. During the post launch MLP debris inspection the plunger and spring from 
the DCS was found on left SRB holddown post #5 still attached to the stud. 
This hardware is normally contained in the DCS housing and remains with 
the SRB aft skirt for flight. Investigation of the anomaly by MSFC/KSC did 
not disclose any hardware or installation procedure discrepancies. 
A RI-Huntsville study in 1990 concluded that there was a 0.054% (1/1850) 
possibility that debris from a holddown post of sufficient size could impact 
flight hardware. This analysis considered all potential debris from 
hoiddown posts except the plunger, plunger pieces and spring. The 
Rockwell assessment of the STS-56 DCS anomaly concluded the additional 
debris from plunger, plunger pieces and spring fall within the scope of the 
1990 analysis and there was no additional debris hazard/risk to STS-56 from 
the plunger and spring debris. As a result of this assessment, a 
recommendation was made to launch STS-55 with the current DCS 
configuration.
148
93MM 787 
Page 3 
No photographic coverage of the left SRB hoiddown post #5 was obtained due 
to camera E-12 malfunction (film break at start). No follow-up action is 
planned. 
3. Multiple pieces of white debris (probably ice/frost) were seen falling from the 
ET/Orbiter umbilicals during SSME ignition on cameras OTV-1 09, OW-i 63, 
OTV-164, E-6 and E-31. Several pieces appeared to contact the underside of 
the Orbiter near the umbilical doors. No damage to the vehicle was visible 
and no follow-up action is planned. 
4. Orange vapor (possibly free burning hydrogen) was seen beneath the body 
flap (cameras OTV-163, E-2, E-30, E-36) and above the rims of SSME #1, 
SSME #2, and SSME #3 (cameras OTV-170, OTV-171, E-4, E-16) at SSME 
ignition. This vapor appears to be similar to the vapor noted on previous 
missions. It is not an issue and no follow-up action is planned. 
5. Several orange flashes were noted in the plume of SSME #3 prior to liftoff on 
cameras OTV-170, E-2, E-3, E-5 and E-19. These flashes are probably debris-
induced and have been seen on previous missions. No follow-up action is 
planned. 
6. A thin, rectangular, dark object originated from the left aft Reaction Control 
System (RCS) stinger area and seen falling aft during SSME ignition on 
camera E-20. KSC stated this was possibly a tile gap filler or tile shim. No 
follow-up action is planned. 
7. On camera E-19, a light-colored object appeared to originate between the L02 
Tail Service Mast (TSM) carrier plate and the Orbiter and fell aft at liftoff. 
Also, from camera E-9, a thin rectangular light-colored piece of debris was 
noted falling through the field of view from left to right in from of the right 
SRB at liftoff. This two camera views are possibly of the same debris object 
(piece of duct tape). This debris did not appear to contact the vehicle. No 
follow-up action is planned. 
8. Several bright debris objects (possibly birds) were noted north of the MLP 
after liftoff at 2.8 seconds MET on cameras KTV-7B, KTV-21B and E-222. 
The objects did not appear to contact the vehicle. Analysis to determine the 
position of the debris objects relative to the Orbiter is being performed at JSC. 
Debris size, velocity, and trajectory will also be determined. No further 
actions is planned at RI/Dny. 
9. A piece of loose thermal curtain tape was observed on the aft skirt of the 
right SRB during liftoff and prior to the roll maneuver on cameras E-25, E-
57, E-220 and E-222. Loose thermal curtain tape has been seen on previous 
missions and no follow-up action required. 
10. Flares and flashes seen in the SSME plume (E-50, E-54, E-207, E-212, E-213, 
E-218, E-223) during ascent. These observations have been seen in the SSME 
plumes on previous missions and are understood to be burning of propellant 
impurities including RCS paper covers. No follow-up action is planned. 
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11. Large clusters of debris particles were seen falling aft of the Orbiter after 
completion of the roll maneuver and before SRB separation on cameras E-
212, E-220 and E-222. The debris were traced to the forward RCS thrusters 
and were pieces of the RCS paper covers. No follow-up action is planned. 
12. The following events have been reported on previous missions and observed 
on STS-56. These are not of major concern, but are documented here for 
information only: 
• Ice debris falling from the ET/Orbiter Umbilical disconnect area. 
• Debris (Insta-foam, water trough) in the holddown post areas 
and MLP. 
• Charring of the ET aft dome. 
• ET aft dome outgassing after liftoff. 
• Butcher paper falling from the RCS. 
• Recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLV 
prior to SRB separation. 
• Slight TPS erosion on the base heat shield during SSME start-up. 
• Twang motion. 
• Body flap motion during the maximum dynamic pressure (MAX-Q) 
region which appeared to have an amplitude and frequency similar to 
those of previous missions. 
• Linear optical distortion, possibly caused by shock waves or ambient 
meteorological conditions near the vehicle, during ascent. 
• Slag in SRB plume after separation. 
• Condensation around the SLV during ascent. 
• Vapor from the SRB stiffener rings after liftoff. 
• Fore-and aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the 
centerline area between the SSME cluster at engine start-up. 
13. Cameras E33 and E41 - OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. DV08P.010 
requires an analysis of launch pad film data to verify that the initial ascent 
clearance separation between the left SRB outer mold line and the falling ET 
vent umbilical structure does not violate the acceptable margin of safety. 
A qualitative assessment has been conducted and positive clearances 
between the left SRB and the ET vent umbilical have been verified. The films 
showed nominal launch pad hardware performance, and no anomalies 
were observed for the SRB body trajectory. 
14. Cameras E7-16 and E27-E28 - OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. 
DV08P.020 requires an analysis of film data of SRM nozzle during liftoff to 
verify nozzle to hoiddown post drift clearance. 
A qualitative assessment of the launch films has been completed. No 
anomalies were observed for the SRM nozzle trajectory and positive 
clearances between the SRB nozzles and the hoiddown posts were verified. 
15. The landing of STS-56 occurred on runway 33 at the KSC Shuttle landing 
facility. Good video and film coverage were obtained and no anomalous 
events were observed. This flight marked the seventh use of the Orbiter drag 
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chute. The drag parachute system performed as expected. All sequenced events 
occurred as expected and no hardware anomalies were observed. 
During the post-landing inspection several tiles were damaged on the right aft 
edge of the vertical stabilizer stinger. This area has sustained damage on 
previous uses of the drag chute by contact with the parachute riser lines. No 
follow-up action has been requested. 
This letter is of particular interest to Messers W. J. Gaylor (VF2) and 
C. F. Martin (MK-SIO-2) at NASAJJSC and NASA/KSC respectively. The 
Integration Contractor contact is R. Ramon at (310) 922-3679. 
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL 
Space Systems Division 
eE gineer 
System Integration 
RR/ly 
cc:	 G. Della Longa, BC4, NASAJJSC, Houston, Tx 
W. J. Gaylor, VF2, NASA/JSC, Houston, Tx 
H. S. Brown, MK-SIO-2, NASAIKSC, Kennedy Space Center, Fl 
D. Pitts, SN15, NASAJJSC, Houston, Tx 
G. Katnik, TV-MSD-22, NASALKSC, Kennedy Space Center, Fl 
B. Hoover, BICO-1, NASAIKSC, Kennedy Space Center, Fl 
T. Rieckhoff, EP55, NASAIMSFC, Huntsville, Al 
Addressee 
NASAJJSC Mail Center (Complete external distribution made via Data Management Systems) 
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